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Abstract
Previous separate models of meaning in life have suggested that meaning is
composed of several components operating across levels of construal. For
example, sometimes people might look to a component of meaning in a state of
concrete construal to gain a sense of consistency or predictability, and at other
times they may look to a component of meaning to create feelings of higher
purpose in life. These models of meaning have the potential to shed light not only
on the various facets of life that make people feel life is meaningful, but to
discover the ways in which these components create feelings of meaning in terms
of both predictability as well as purpose. These models also have great potential
for understanding the ways in which people compensate for threats to meaning at
different levels of construal. The goal of the present investigation was to test the
idea that people experience meaning at both concrete and abstract levels of
construal, and to assess which types of standards create meaning in live most
effectively. Specifically, I tested the hypothesis that morality may be especially
effective at creating feelings of both predictability and purpose more effectively
than convention. In addition, the present research examined whether or not
morality is especially effective at compensating for threats to feelings of
predictability and higher purpose compared to convention for these same reasons.
These ideas were tested in three studies. In Study 1, participants rated the
extent to which two types of standards, conventional standards and moral
standards, provide a sense of predictability (i.e. “coherence”) and a sense of
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purpose (i.e. “transcendence”). In Study 2, participants completed a construal
level manipulation designed to induce states of concrete or abstract construal and
then rated the extent to which conventional and moral standards provide
consistency and purpose. In a third study, participants completed a faux
personality inventory and received false feedback suggesting they would live a
life characterized by either low or average levels of either predictability
(coherence) or purpose (transcendence).
The results of Study 1 demonstrated that participants found more
coherence and transcendence in their moral standards compared to their
conventional standards. In addition, moral standards provided much more
transcendence than conventional standards, whereas morality created slightly
more coherence than conventional standards. The results of Study 2 showed no
effects, and the results of Study 3 demonstrated that participants found their moral
standards to be much more important to them than their conventional standards.
The overall results of all three studies suggest that people see their moral
standards as providing more meaning in life, especially in the form of
transcendence, than their conventional standards. The results also suggest that
moral standards are generally more important to people than conventional
standards. Overall, these results suggest that people may be able to experience a
broader sense of purpose in life by focusing on moral standards.
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Introduction
It has been argued that the central motivating factor behind all scientific,
philosophical, literary, and artistic endeavors is the pursuit of meaning in life
(Camus, 1955; Frankl, 1963, Heine, Proulx, & Vohs, 2006). Meaning in life is
important to human beings, and higher levels of meaning in life are related to
increased wellbeing (Antonovski, 1993; Ryff, 1989) and an enhanced ability to
cope with unexpected or difficult life-circumstances (Park & Folkman, 1997; Zika
& Chamberlain, 1992). Philosophers (e.g. Camus, 1955) as well as psychologists
(Heine, Proulx & Vohs, 2006) suggest that meaning is a core motivating force in
human life, and that a life without meaning may not seem worth living at all.
Hence, it is important to examine how meaning in life is most effectively created
and protected.
Psychologists have examined factors that allow people to both create and
defend their sense of meaning in life. One prominent model of meaning, the
Meaning Maintenance Model (Heine et al., 2006), proposes that a number of
factors (i.e. “components”) contribute to a sense of meaning in life. These
components include certainty, belonging, self-esteem, and feelings of symbolic
immortality. According to meaning maintenance theorists, meaning is a sense of
consistency between beliefs, expectations, and events, and the presence of any
one of the components of meaning constitutes a marker of meaning in life.
Other theorists (e.g., Steger, 2012; Wong, 2012) have examined meaning
in terms of its ability to create not only feelings of consistency, but of purpose.
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These theorists suggest that people seek meaning to feel that the environment is
consistent and predictable, and also to feel that there is a greater purpose to life
than what occurs in predictable day-to-day living. These theorists suggest that
consistency is indeed important when it comes to creating a sense of meaning in
life, but that people also want to believe in an overall reason for living in the first
place (Wong, 2012).
Meaning and its Two Dimensions
Meaning has been defined as mental representations of relationships
among people, events, and things (Bruner & Postman, 1949; Heine et al., 2006), a
sense of coherence concerning one’s environment, self, group, and roles
(Antonovski, 1979; Battista & Almond, 1973; Heine, Proulx & Vohs, 2006) and
the web of connections, understandings, and interpretations that help us
comprehend our experience and formulate plans (Baumeister, 1991; Steger, 2012).
Meaning has also been referred to as goal directedness and purposefulness
(Klinger, 1977; Ryff & Singer, 1988), the ultimate purpose of life (Steger, 2012a)
and a sense that one’s individual life (Yalom, 1980), and life in general, has
purpose (Park, 2010; Steger, 2012a; Steger, Frasier, Oishi & Kaler, 2006; Ryff,
1989; Ryff & Singer, 1998).
Within these definitions of meaning, there seem to be two overarching
themes. Some researchers seem to suggest that meaning is based on congruence
between expectations and outcomes (e.g., Heine et al., 2006; Proulx, 2013). These
researchers suggest that meaning threats are the result of incongruence and
violated expectations (Somerville, Heatherton, & Kelly, 2006), and that meaning

	
  

5	
  	
  

is created by a sense of consistency between the internal and external
manifestations of important areas of life. Recent meaning theorists (Heine et al.,
2006) suggest that consistency can be created through a variety of components,
such as certainty, belonging, self-esteem, and symbolic immortality. For example,
a person might create a sense of meaning by focusing on the certainty of their
beliefs and acting in accordance with them. A person might also find meaning by
gaining the acceptance of a group, by seeing oneself positively after doing a good
deed, or by engaging in actions that enable them to feel that their deeds in life will
benefit future generations. Overall, recent theory about meaning in life suggests
that behaving in ways that create, and are consistent with, desires for certainty,
belonging, self-esteem, and symbolic immortality, create feelings of meaning in
life. Based primarily on this perspective, I will use certainty, belonging, views of
the self (e.g., self-esteem), and symbolic immortality to represent the construct of
meaning in life throughout the remainder of this paper.
Aside from perspectives suggesting that meaning is created primarily
through consistency, other theorists (e.g., Arndt et al., 2013; Steger, 2012; Wong,
2012) suggest that meaning operates in terms of “micro and “macro” level
representations. This perspective suggests that meaning in the form of micro
representations is concerned with how people deal with the immediate
environment, and macro representations of meaning are concerned with
relationships between life events that represent their overall value or purpose
(Arndt et al., 2013; Steger, 2012). These theorists suggest that people pursue
micro and macro level meaning for different reasons. For example, people might
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look to micro level meanings, like environmental predictability, for survival value,
and they may look to macro levels of meaning, like cultural values, to feel that
there is an ultimate reason for living, and perhaps to even transcend the fear of
death (Steger 2012; Wong, 2012).
In response to these overarching perspectives of the meaning construct,
Wetherell (unpublished manuscript) developed the Integrated Model of Meaning.
This model states that people can experience meaning by focusing on any of the
components proposed by meaning maintenance theorists in states of concrete or
abstract construal. More specifically, the model proposes that people can
experience meaning both concretely, at its micro level, and abstractly, at its macro
level. This new framework takes into account the perspective that meaning is
created through consistency (Heine et al., 2006), and allows for various
components of meaning to operate at low or high levels of abstraction (i.e.,
construal). This integration of the meaning literature accounts for the multiple
constructs that give life meaning at both higher and lower levels of abstraction.
According to the Integrated Model of Meaning (Wetherell, unpublished
manuscript), components of meaning are construed concretely to create a sense of
“coherence” which is meaning based on a sense of predictability and safety.
Meaning can also be construed abstractly to focus on and fulfill the need for
“transcendence” or greater purpose in life, a type of meaning dealing not only
with predictability and safety, but searching for a reason to live at all. For
example, a person might feel meaningful because they are protected by society (a
low level construal of meaning creating coherence). Alternatively, people may
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experience meaning because they feel that they have fulfilled the goals in line
with their cultural values or have contributed to a cause greater than themselves.
The Integrated Model of Meaning examines coherence and transcendence in
detail and makes predictions about their specific functions.
Coherence. Coherence is concerned with the struggle for predictability,
consistency, and safety. People want to create consistency between expectations
and outcomes (e.g. Antonovski, 1987; Bruner & Postman, 1949; Heine, et al.,
2006) to help them predict and control life circumstances (Heine, et al., 2006;
Peacock & Reker, 1982; Steger, 2009; 2012a; White, 1959). For example, people
can create feelings of consistency within the self through the perception that
following the guidelines provided by belief systems affects actual outcomes
(Heine et al., 2006; Steger, 2012).
In line with the idea that coherence is geared towards meeting immediate
survival goals, the Integrated Model of Meaning suggests that coherence is
construed concretely, as concrete construal is related to more narrowed goal
pursuit and focus compared to abstract construal (Gable & Harmon-Jones, 2008;
Harmon-Jones & Gable, 2009). Concrete construal is a state in which people
focus on the immediate environment. This immediate focus can occur temporally
by leading people to focus on the near future as opposed to the distant future
(Liberman & Trope, 1998; Trope & Liberman, 2003), spatially by leading people
to focus on and think about objects that are physically close compared to distant
objects (Trope & Liberman, 2010), socially when people look for similarities
rather than differences (Trope & Liberman, 2010) and hypothetically, by
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impacting whether or not people think things are likely to occur in the near
(concrete) or distant (abstract) future (Liberman & Trope, 1998). When a person
is attempting to make sense of an immediate and potentially confusing situation,
they may shift to a state of concrete construal to examine the specifics of the
situation at hand across temporal, spatial, social, or hypothetical dimensions. In
support of this idea, some theory and research suggests that people who live in
harsh and unpredictable environments tend to operate predominantly in states of
concrete construal to help attend to immediate concerns in the environment
(White, 2010).
Is certainty necessary for coherence? To the extent that coherence is a
sense of consistency, predictability, and safety, one might think that certainty is a
prerequisite for creating a sense of coherence. This may or may not be the case.
Coherence by definition represents a sense that one can predict and potentially
control the environment. In order to make predictions and affect outcomes one
must be relatively sure of causal relationships between objects in the environment
and the way in which one’s actions will affect outcomes. Based on this line of
reasoning one might conclude that one must be certain of the relation between
things to feel coherence.
This need for certainty may also carry over into the way in which selfesteem, belonging, and symbolic immortality provide coherence. The integrated
model of meaning suggests that components of meaning other than certainty may
also create consistency, predictability, and a sense of safety, but it may be
possible that certainty is built into these components at the level of coherence. For
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example, belonging may provide a sense of social cohesion and allow people to
feel that they will be taken care of by those who appreciate them. It is hard to
conceive of a situation in which a person feels uncertain about their belonging yet
feels that they know how people will react to them and knows that society will
protect them. Hence, at the level of coherence, certainty may be a core factor, and
may be inextricably bound up with the remaining components of meaning.
On the other hand, there may be circumstances in which a person can feel
a sense of coherence and yet still feel uncertain about things. For example, a
scientist may feel that the universe is coherently organized through physical laws
that can be expressed mathematically, but admit to being uncertain about all the
inner workings of the universe. As of yet, the integrated model of meaning makes
no explicit prediction or statement about whether or not certainty is required for a
sense of coherence, and as such, this issue is beyond the scope of the experiments
presented here.
Transcendence. Transcendence, the second dimension of meaning in life,
is the sense that one’s life has an ultimate purpose. Transcendence is the
dimension of meaning representative of what previous researchers have called
“self-transcendence” (Peacock & Reker, 1982; Reker, 1991) “global belief
systems” (Janolf-Bulman, 1992), “meaningfulness” or “significance” (Prat &
Ashforth, 2003), and an approach system of meaning (Wong, 2012). The sense of
purpose represented by transcendence is the dimension of meaning most
associated with the lay understanding of meaning (Park, 2010; Steger, 2012;
Steger, Frasier, Oishi & Kaler, 2006; Ryff, 1989; Ryff & Singer, 1998). In
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contrast to coherence, transcendence enables people to feel that their lives are
more than just the sum of individual experiences and that there is an ultimately
meaningful reason to live (Wong, 2008). Transcendence also encompasses
broader spiritual matters concerned with group life, self worth, and the purpose
and care of humanity as a whole (Mascaro, Rosen, & Morey, 2004; Reker, 2000).
In contrast to coherence, transcendence is construed abstractly to allow
one to take an “aerial” view of their life circumstances and to search for and
understand their life purpose. People shift to abstract construal when they want to
understand significant life events (Forster, 2009; Trope & Liberman, 2010). For
example, abstract construal increases the ease with which people piece together
causal sequences (Helzer & Edwards, 2012), and people prompted to think in
abstract compared to concrete terms feel they better understand the overall cause
or purpose of events (Namkoong & Henderson, 2013). Transcendence, in contrast
to coherence, allows people to piece together constellations of relationships
between circumstances and events representing the overall reason for their
occurrence. Overall, people who experience feelings of both safety and
predictability (i.e., coherence) and purpose (i.e., transcendence) are most fulfilled
(Peacock & Reker, 1982; Reker, 1991; Steger, 2009; 2012; Wong, 2012).
The margins between coherence and transcendence. The proposition that
meaning operates across dimensions of construal (i.e. coherence and
transcendence) suggests that there should be instances in which coherence and
transcendence are related to one another. For example, to the extent that a person
feels that there is a transcendent meaning to their life, they may cultivate a sense
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of coherence in even the most chaotic of situations. In such a case a person would
experience a strong relation between coherence and transcendence. The integrated
model of meaning also proposes that transcendence may compensate for, and thus
be related to coherence to a greater extent than coherence compensates for and is
related to transcendence.
In spite of this, some thinkers, such as the romantic philosophers (Kant,
1914) suggest that a sense of coherence is a launch pad to the absolute, thus
providing a hint that some people may first build a sense of coherence and this
sense may help them to feel transcendent. Psychological theorists, such as
Maslow (1943), propose models that are suggestive of this process. For example,
Maslow’s hierarchy of needs suggests that people first seek physical safety before
trying to reach their full potential and purpose, a state called “self-actualization”.
This provides an example of a situation in which coherence and transcendence
should be highly related.
The integrated model of meaning does not suggest, however, that
coherence and transcendence are identical constructs, so there should also be
instances in which coherence and transcendence are not related at all. Some
people may have absolutely no need to feel that their lives mean something, but
have a strong need to feel predictability and physical comfort. Such a
circumstance may arise with a hedonistic orientation in which a person cares only
for creature comforts. For such a person, coherence will have no relation to
transcendence and would not provide a manner to create transcendence.
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Standards of Behavior
There may be different ways that people create meaning in life across
dimensions of construal. People may create meaning through social conventions,
or standards of relative social conduct adopted by groups of people to coordinate
action (Nucci & Turiel, 1978) and create feelings of predictability in a specific
situation (i.e., coherence). Additionally, people may adhere to conventional
standards to fulfill a higher-level (i.e., transcendent) goal, like ensuring the safety
of society. In contrast to conventional standards, people may also look to moral
standards (sets of beliefs and value representing what a persons feels is absolutely
right or wrong; Skitka, Bauman & Sargis, 2005) to create a sense of meaning at
high and low levels of construal as well.
Conventional standards. One way a person might create structure and
consistency is by following conventional standards (i.e., social conventions),
which are norms commonly followed in a society (Nucci & Turiel, 1978; Skitka,
Bauman, & Sargis, 2005). Social conventions are expectations people adhere to in
order to create a common set of standards to abide by, but are not seen as
reflecting what is absolutely right or wrong. For example, some societies might
eat dinner late at night and some might eat dinner in the early evening. Because
conventional standards are relative, a person moving to a separate country will
often spontaneously adopt the conventions of their new nation as a matter of
course. For example, a person in the United States who is used to eating with a
fork might adopt local conventions in Japan and eat with chopsticks, or drive on
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the left side of the road in the United Kingdom. This characteristic of
conventional standards suggests that whether a person follows conventional
standards depends on the mandates of social norms or authority figures (Nucci &
Turiel, 1978). In other words, conventional standards are externally imposed and
are descriptive of the way that people are expected to relate to one another in a
given environment (Kohlberg, 1984, Selman, 1980). Such ideas suggest that
conventional standards are post-social (Durkheim, 1925/1973; Turiel, 2006).
Just as social conventions depend on the mandates of authority or social
norms, they are not experienced as objective or universal (Turiel, 2006). This
means that conventions are seen as subjective (and sometimes arbitrary), although
they are often put in place to provide order (Nucci & Turiel, 1976; Smetana,
1984). Thus, when people experience a standard as conventional they may see it
as serving a function, but are willing to substitute other behaviors that serve the
same purpose. For example, people in the United States abide by traffic laws and
stop at red lights. However, if new laws were enacted so that drivers had to stop at
purple lights, they would adapt. Such a situation indicates that feelings about the
color of traffic signals are based on conventional standards, as they are subjective
and imposed by social norms and lawmakers to create order. This means that
people feel that conventional standards apply only in the context of a given
society or situation. If society was to break down or needed to change, people
would change their conventional standards. For these reasons, there may be limits
to the sense of structure and predictability that conventional standards create. In
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unfamiliar contexts, people may become confused about what is conventional,
and need to look to the behavior of others as a model for their own.
Because conventional standards are externally imposed, people often do
not feel strong emotions directed at others when others violate conventional
standards (Smetana, 1984). For example, it is convention to follow specific sets of
table manners in Western countries. In the United States and most parts of Europe,
people eat with spoons, forks, and knives, but not with their fingers. If people in
Western countries see someone from another country eat with their fingers, they
will most likely not experience any strong emotional reaction, and will not blame
the person violating convention for their actions, particularly if they believe the
other person does not know the local customs. In addition, if people were to
experience an emotional reaction (e.g., revulsion) when seeing a person eating
with their fingers, they probably would not be revolted by the person, but revolted
in general in response to seeing something considered unhygienic or messy. In
instances such as these, it is also possible that people will be angry with someone
who violates convention, but not because there is something innately wrong with
eating with one’s fingers-it simply violates an agreed-upon social standard. If the
rules were changed such that eating with fingers was convention, people would
not become angry at others for eating with their fingers.
A note about personal preferences. Before continuing on to an analysis
of moral standards, I think that it is important to examine a second, as of yet
unmentioned type of social standard – personal preference. I do not include
personal preferences in the current investigation for theoretical reasons, and feel it
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is important to describe why this is the case in the context of the extant literature
on behavioral standards. It is important to make a distinction between
conventional standards and personal preferences. Personal preferences are
subjective preferences that individuals have but, in contrast to conventional
standards, preferences are not socially regulated (Nucci 2001; Turiel, 2002). For
example, one person might prefer vanilla ice cream to chocolate ice cream. There
is no law, norm, or social standard stating or tacitly implying that a person should
prefer vanilla to chocolate ice cream. In addition, it is extremely unlikely that a
person with such a preference would believe that all people should prefer vanilla
to chocolate ice cream, that such a preference should be present across all
situations, that it represents what is objectively right or wrong, and that seeing a
person eats chocolate ice cream would spark anger and disgust. In addition, in
contrast to conventional standards, personal preferences are not socially regulated.
From this example, we can see that personal preferences are not seen as objective
and universal, nor are they associated with strong emotions towards people who
do not adhere to them.
In the context of the present research, I do not examine preferences
because I do not think that they should have the same ability to provide meaning
as conventional standards. Conventional standards are shared by people and
communities, which may make them more capable of creating a sense of certainty
and predictability across situations. Preferences should not provide as much
predictability because one’s personal preferences do not give a person an idea of
how others will behave. People may also derive a sense of belonging by adhering
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to the conventions of their social group, and may feel good about themselves if
they adhere correctly to conventional standards. It is unlikely that one will
experience a strong bond with a community of vanilla iced cream eaters and
derive a sense of pride from eating one’s preferred ice cream.
Not all standards are relative like conventional standards and personal
preferences, however, and some standards are experienced as less mutable than
conventional standards. Moral standards constitute such a type of standard.
Moral standards. In addition to conventional standards, people adhere to
moral standards (e.g., Nucci & Turiel, 1976; Skitka et al., 2005) that are
experienced as objective, universal, and indicative of what is absolutely right or
wrong. In other words, moral standards have prescriptive and proscriptive
characteristics (Kohlberg, 1984, Selman, 1980), and are based on value judgments
about how people should behave. If a person experiences a standard as moral,
they see it as applicable to all situations and societies regardless of the situation or
what the society in question holds to be true. For example, a person with moral
beliefs about abortion (e.g., a belief that it is wrong) will see abortion as wrong
across all societies regardless of particular social laws or customs. Evidence for
this proposition comes from domain theorists (e.g., Turiel, 2006) who find that
children are willing to defy authority figures (e.g., teachers) when they are told to
do something they consider morally wrong, such as hitting another child. The
same researchers find that children are compliant with orders to adhere to social
conventions such as waiting in line, or sitting, as opposed to standing, while
eating a snack. These findings suggest that moral standards are held
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independently of social norms and the mandates of authority figures, and seen as
objective and universal. Because of the objectivity and universality of moral
standards, people may experience them as a powerful source of consistency and
predictability, potentially to an even greater extent than they experience social
conventions. Furthermore, the objective and universal characteristics of moral
standards may create feelings of consistency and predictability across situations to
a greater extent than conventional standards, which are experienced relatively.
Whereas people attempting to interpret how to behave in a specific situation based
on conventional standards may sometimes become confused or uncertain, one’s
moral standards may provide absolute guides for behavior across all situations
and social contexts.
In addition to being independent of authority and experienced as objective
and universal, moral standards are associated with strong emotions such as anger
and disgust when their moral standards are violated (Mullen & Skitka, 2006) and
that people experience these emotions towards specific moral violators (Tetlock,
2002; Tetlock et al., 2000). For example, if a person believes that abortion is
wrong, and they are in a country where abortion is legal, they will see those who
get abortions as immoral and feel strong negative emotions (e.g., anger and
disgust) towards them in spite of abortion’s legality. This suggests that moral
standards differ from conventional standards because they are accompanied by
strong negative emotions towards those who violate moral sensibilities. Because
of the strong emotions that accompany the violation moral standards may provide
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a greater and more immediate sense of certainty about what the correct behaviors
are in any situation.
Overall, and in contrast to conventional standards, moral standards are
experienced as objective and universal and as applicable to all situations and
social contexts. Moral standards are authority independent, meaning that people
adhere to their moral standards even when there are legal and social consequences
for doing so, and will often shirk the mandates of authority follow their moral
standards. When people see someone violate their moral standards, they
experience strong negative emotions towards that person.
Theorists and researchers have struggled to understand the processes
through which an issue becomes moral. For example, the philosopher David
Hume (1777/1960) suggested that people are able to use reason to ascertain
whether or not an act will harm others, but caring for others is necessary to
produce a moral judgment. Kohlberg (1971) posited that children begin their lives
as egoists, only avoiding behavior if they think it will be punished, and later
develop the ability to take the perspective of others. These perspectives suggest, at
least in part, that reason and logical thought drive judgments and moral feelings
about the acts of others. On the contrary, modern social psychologists (Haidt,
2001; Nucci & Turiel, 1978) suggest that some acts, such as harm, elicit powerful
emotions that predate moral reason, and are sensed as innately immoral.
There is still much work to be done to understand the process through
which beliefs become moralized. Based on the above citations, it could be the
case that people learn moral standards from authority figures and then internalize
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them, creating a sense of objectivity and universal morality. Once this sense of
objectivity and universality is established, a standard become moralized, and thus
authority independent and resistant to change. It could also be the case however,
that people are born with an innate moral sense, and that this moral sense guides
behavior from the outset, leading them to defy authorities when it comes to their
moral beliefs.
In the current work, I examine standards of behavior (conventional and
moral) based on the assumption that participants have already established
conventional and moral standards in their own lives that they can think about, feel
strongly, and act upon. Thus, within the current framework, I define moral
standards as authority independent, and conventional standards as authority
dependent, although it may be the case that some standards are first experienced
as conventional and become moral later on, or that some standards are
experienced as moral innately.
It is often the case that people speak about their morals in tandem with
their religious beliefs. To create greater conceptual clarity and to avoid conflating
moral and religious standards, it is important to turn briefly to a description of
how moral and religious standards are different from one another.
Are moral standards and religious beliefs identical constructs? It is
important to examine whether or not moral standards are different not only from
conventional standards but from religious standards. One might argue based on
social observation that religious beliefs are almost always experienced as moral
standards as well, but research does not support this idea. The extant literature on
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religion and morality is more supportive of the view that there is often overlap
between religious and moral beliefs within people, but religion and moral beliefs
do not overlap completely; they are still distinct constructs. For example, domain
theorists (Nucci & Turiel, 1993) asked members of Mennonite and Jewish
congregations whether or not acts characterized as moral (e.g., stealing, hitting,
slander, and property damage) would be justified if God said they were okay. The
large majority of people in these congregations stated that these acts would be
morally wrong even if God said they were permissible, suggesting that what
people experience as morally and religiously justified is not always the same.
Conversely, they found that issues they characterized as non-moral and based
solely on religious conventions (e.g., interfaith marriage, working on the Sabbath)
were seen as acceptable to change with God’s permission, and almost universally
acceptable for other religious groups to bypass. These results suggest that moral
beliefs often exist independently from religious beliefs, and what people
experience as moral is experienced as immutable across situations regardless of
its religious context. In addition, this research suggests that conventional
standards associated with religious doctrine are experienced as flexible, as is the
case in religions such as Catholicism in which religious authorities may change
what is customary (e.g., not eating meat on Friday).
Similarly, moral conviction researchers have found that moral conviction
predicts outcomes such as trust in authority figures (Skitka, Bauman & Lytle,
2009; Wisneski, Lytle & Skitka, 2009) while controlling for religious conviction.
It is notable that religious conviction and moral conviction can even predict trust
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in authority in opposite directions, with moral conviction predicting decreased
trust in authority to make proper decisions about moral issues, and religious
conviction relating to greater trust in authorities to make the same decisions.
These findings mirror those of the domain theorists and go one step further and
demonstrate that morality is authority-independent to a greater extent than both
religious beliefs and conventional standards.
This is not to say that no religious beliefs are experienced as moral or that
all religious beliefs are conventional. For example, Nucci and Turiel (1993) found
that some congregation members did say that they would not object to stealing if
God told them to. They came to this conclusion based on the grounds that divine
authority trumps terrestrial morals, even if people do not understand or like God’s
decisions. Also, these same researchers found that many congregation members
would still continue the conventions of their religion without the directive of God,
and a small number even said they think the conventions of their religions
generalize to those of other faiths. These results suggest that some people may
experience an issue as a part of their religious beliefs but not their moral standards
(or vice versa), and that others may experience the same issue as a moral and
religious standard as neither a moral nor religious standard. This idea is in line
with modern moral theorists (e.g., Skitka, 2010) who take a ideographic (within
person) approach to morality that allows for flexibility within the individual
regarding whether or not an issue is moral, conventional, religious, or some
combination of the three.
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Conventional and Moral Standards Provide Meaning
Overall, both conventional and moral standards may provide feelings of
consistency and predictability, and also higher purpose in life. A person seeking
purpose might look to conventional standards to explanation why we are here on
earth (e.g., we are here to make sure the species proliferates). Moral standards
may also provide people with codes to live by that not only provide order, but that
imbue life with feelings of ultimate purpose.
In addition to differing in objectivity, universality, authority independence,
and emotional strength, moral and conventional standards may be experienced
either in concrete or abstract states of mind. People should experience their moral
standards as immutable no matter what level of construal they operate under
because moral standards, by definition, are seen as representing what is absolutely
right or wrong. However, people might experience their morals at low levels of
construal pertaining to specific situations, with no overarching set of values or
ideas guiding them, or at high levels of construal, seeing their morals as driving a
wide variety of situations based on a set of universal values. Similarly,
conventions should be seen as relative, as they do not represent absolute right or
wrong, but conventions may also operate at low levels of construal, with people
following convention for no reason (e.g., driving on the right as opposed to the
left side of the road) or based on broader goals (e.g., eating with plastic chopsticks
to decrease wood usage). Overall, moral and conventional standards should retain
their defining characteristics at any level of abstraction, but the level of construal
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at which a person experiences conventional and moral standards may color how
they perceive these standards, and maybe even have implications for how such
standards provide meaning. It is therefore important to examine how conventional
and moral standards may operate across the dimensions of coherence and
transcendence.
Conventional standards provide coherence. Conventional standards
may be a source of predictability and consistency in day-to-day life because they
describe social expectations. People frequently abide by conventional standards as
a template of behavior to follow in a given situation, even very simple situations
at low levels of construal. At a dinner party, for example, a person may use a
specific dinner fork to eat a meal and pass food clockwise around the table
because it is a conventional standard that enables people to collectively coordinate
their behavior. Such conventional standards may create coherence because they
enable consistent and predictable patterns of behavior. However, in such a case,
there is no reason other than that it is a conventional standard to use the fork in
question, or pass the dishes in one direction compared to another. That is, these
conventional standards are arbitrary. If someone were to use a slightly bigger fork
or begin passing the dishes counterclockwise, it is doubtful that anyone would
truly mind, and people may even adapt to the new behavior.
This example contains several ways in which conventional standards
construed concretely can provide coherence. By establishing a clear set of norms
for silverware use and plate passing, the guests are able to know which way to
coordinate their behavior so that everyone efficiently received food and are able
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to consume it properly. In addition, conventional standards also allow the guests
to establish a sense of consistency in their environment by providing a set of
guidelines to follow at all dinner parties, without any need to inquire about what
is proper.
Conventional standards provide transcendence. Conventional standards
may also be experienced at higher levels of construal. Some theorists (e.g.,
Sheppard & Cushman, 2010) suggest that people hold conventional standards
with both low and high levels of abstraction. Specifically, these researchers
suggest that people can see social conventions not only in low-level black and
white terms but also as aspirations to live up to. However, as is the case with
conventional standards in general, abstract conventional standards may not be
seen as absolutely necessary or mandatorily upheld. An example from the
literature is that lawyers are encouraged to serve 50 hours of pro-bono legal work
per year by the bar association with the overarching, abstract goal of increasing
service work in the legal professions (Sheppard & Cushman, 2010). However, this
is not mandatory, and different attorneys experience varied levels of commitment
to this ideal. Many lawyers see the 50 hour pro-bono time commitment as
laudable, but do not feel personally compelled to complete it, nor do they feel
badly about themselves if they do not live up to it, or angry or disgusted with
others for not reaching this goal. Another illustrative example, based on the dinner
party scenario above, would be a case in which people use proper silverware and
pass dishes counterclockwise, but for a different reason than social coordination;
to show their appreciation for their hosts and the other guests at the table. In this
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situation the guests at the dinner party abide by a convention construed abstractly
(i.e. a transcendent convention) with the goal of honoring the home of another.
From these examples, we can see that transcendent conventional standards
are similar in some ways to coherent conventional standards, but there are
differences between conventional standards across levels of construal. As is the
case with coherent conventional standards, transcendent conventional standards
are externally imposed. In the case of a dinner party, most people use specific
silverware and pass plates in specific ways because it has been established by
others as conventional, If an authoritative institution (e.g. the association for
silverware usage and plate movement directionality) were to change the rules, it
seems quite likely that most people would change their dinner etiquette. In
contrast to the concretely construed convention of passing food in a specific
direction around the table, however, a person might do so to honor their hosts and
other guests. This transcendent conventional standard is also not experienced as
objective or universal, and if there were another way to behave that would fulfill
this same function, a person experiencing their dinner etiquette as convention
would be willing to change their behavior. Even if transcendent conventional
standards are not experienced with the same objectivity and universality as moral
standards, the overarching reasoning behind such conventions may instill people
with a sense of purpose when they abide by them.
Based on the theoretical perspective proposed above, it seems that
conventional standards can operate at both low and high levels of construal.
Whether or not a person follows conventional standards because it is what is
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arbitrarily expected by society, or because they have an overarching goal or
purpose in mind, conventional standards are not held with a sense of objectivity
and universality across all situations, nor do they operate independently of
authority or evoke strong emotions towards violators of conventional standards.
Moral Standards Provide Meaning
Most if not all people have beliefs and intuitions about themselves, their
ideologies and their actions, that they think are reflective of what is universally
right or wrong (Haidt, 2001; Skitka et al., 2005). Viewing life through the lens of
one’s moral standards may be very effective at providing coherence,
transcendence, or both. Initial support for the idea that moral standards provide
coherence and transcendence comes from philosophers such as Immanuel Kant,
who suggests that moral laws reside in a higher, “supersensible” realm in which
truth resides (Kant, 1914). Kant stated that two things fill him with awe: “the
starry skies above, and the moral laws within”, implying that moral standards
create a sense of coherence, as does watching systematic patterns in nature, buy
also have a transcendent quality that allows us to feel that the majesty of this
system can be experienced through feelings of purpose in life. Such observations
suggest that moral standards may create the order and structure necessary to foster
coherence and the feelings of purpose necessary to create transcendence.
In the last century, moral psychologists have studied the development of
moral cognition (Kohlberg, 1969; Piaget, 1935; Turiel, 1983), the feelings, and
cognitions, that result from moral attitudes and beliefs (Haidt, 2001; Mullen &
Skitka, 2006; Skitka et al., 2005), and the ways that moral standards affect
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behavior (Bandura, 1991; 1996; 1999; Bandura & McDonald, 1963; Skitka et al,
2005; Skitka & Bauman, 2008). Psychologists have examined how moral
standards foster group coherence (Durkheim, 1951; Haidt, Seder, & Kesebir,
2008; Baumeister & Leary, 1995; Leary, Tambor, Terdal, & Downs, 1995;
Tomasello & Vaish, 2013), facilitate the common good and create an environment
of ideal reciprocity (Piaget, 1935), and steer views of right and wrong (Kohlberg,
1976; Skitka, et al., 2005). From these functions of morality one can see that
moral standards are multifaceted and provide predictability and certainty through
individual and social coordination, affecting feelings of self-worth, and guiding
the life path in ways that potentially allows one to feel their life matters at a level
beyond that of the individual.
Moral standards provide coherence. A wide range of research and
theory suggests that moral standards are a powerful source of coherence across
aspects of life that create meaning. Prominent psychologists such as Lawrence
Kohlberg (1984) have proposed theories of moral development featuring moral
standards as a source of rules that regulate social norms and behaviors that create
organizing social principles. For example, adolescents may adhere to their morals
because they feel that thy represent what is right or wrong, but these adolescents
also frequently do not have a good reason (Kohlberg, 1984). People often
experience what I propose are concretely construed moral beliefs with absolute
certainty (Haidt, 2001). Furthermore, moral standards contribute to the structure
of society by influencing laws and culture (Durkheim, 1897; Haidt, Seder, &
Kesibir, 2008), people have a strong need to feel that their behavior is consistent
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with their beliefs (Hardy & Carlo, 2005), and beliefs imbued with a sense of
morality (such as some religious beliefs; Hogg et al., 2010) can carry with them
feelings of literal immortality. Overall, evidence suggests that moral standards are
a major organizing force across aspects of life that provides coherence.
Psychological research supports the view that moral standards create
coherence by providing certainty. People feel a strong impetus to act on behalf of
their morals (Skitka, 2010), and moral standards give people a framework
requiring no deliberation regarding how to react to circumstances, as is illustrated
in cases in which people refuse to endorse eating the family dog, even if it died in
a car accident (Haidt, 2001). Not only do moral standards guide behavior, people
see their moral standards as absolutely true and applicable in all circumstances
(Skitka, 2010). Moral standards are experienced as objective and universal in the
sense that people experience them as readily apparent and applicable everywhere,
much as they see the solution to rudimentary arithmetic problems. These
characteristics of moral standards may contain a built-in sense of coherence by
providing readily available interpretations of events and behavior as well as
immediate guidance across situations.
The characteristics of moral standards may allow them to provide
coherence by allowing people to unify behind common moral standards. Social
affiliation is based on consensual beliefs about how we should treat and be treated
by others (Hogg, 2003; Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, &
Wetherell, 1987), and moral standards relate to social referents that give people
their conceptions of how to treat others (Reed, 2002). Hence, organizing society
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around moral standards may create coherence by providing powerful and
immediate intuitive guidance in cooperative settings in which people must
coordinate action.
Moral standards may also be an especially powerful organizing force in
society because they give people clear guidelines about how to behave across
social contexts. For example, research demonstrates that children will not hit
other children even if ordered to by an authority figure because they have a gut
sense that harming another is wrong. However, they will break other rules like
standing while eating a snack when told by the same authority figure (Nucci &
Turiel, 1978). Some theorists have even suggested that a sense of unpredictability
and despair sets in when groups do not have an overarching set of morals to abide
by and they are forced to abide by their own individual drives and desires
(Durkheim [1987] 1951, p.208; Haidt, Seder, & Kesebir, 2008). Additional
research shows that moral standards are not only related to beliefs about how
people should treat each other, but also to increased intentions to engage in
collective action, a result that is associated not only with feelings of belonging,
but with feelings of efficacy and control (van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2012).
This research suggests that moral standards bind groups together behind a
common set of goals they feel are ultimately just. De Waal’s (1996) primate
studies even lead him to conclude that moral standards are actually required to
live in the complex social systems exhibited by chimps, bonobos, and humans.
People also create coherence through the idea that they themselves are
personally consistent and virtuous in their beliefs and attributes. Aristotle, in his
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Ethics, proposed moral standards as the most important point of reference a
person can use to evaluate him or herself (McIntyre, 1984; Leach et al., 2007). In
The Varieties of Religious Experience, William James (1985) states that moral
enthusiasm unifies the “discordant self.” When seeking to create coherent
representations of the self, people seek to maintain a moral identity, a selfconception organized around a set of moral traits (Aquino & Reed, 2002). People
aspire to virtuous behavior and to create a sense of self-worth (Crocker & Wolfe,
2001; MacDonald, Saltzman, & Leary, 2003; Park, Crocker, & Mikelson, 2004),
and have a desire to feel morally adequate (Sherman & Cohen, 2006; Steele,
1988). People may adhere to moral standards to create the sense of a coherent,
virtuous self, as an indicator that one is abiding by social rules, fulfilling social
obligations, and demonstrating competence (Bandura, Barbaranelli, Caprara, &
Pastorelli, 1996; Kohlberg, 1984; Leary & Baumeister, 1995). Among children,
the perception that one has behaved morally is associated with greater self-esteem
(Reese, Bird, &Tripp, 2007), and moral symbolization (the idea that one’s
behavior reflects desired moral traits) is related to positive feelings toward the self
(Aquino & Reed, 2002) a potential source of consistency based on the perception
that one has lived up to their own standards, and therefore is coherence. Further
evidence suggests that people seek consistency between moral standards and
actions because such consistency is important for maintaining relationships that
aid in survival (Gergen, 1998).
Moral standards provide transcendence. The sense of objectivity,
universality, and sacredness provided by moral standards may also contribute to

	
  

31	
  	
  

their ability to provide transcendence when moral standards are construed
abstractly. For example, social identity theorists argue that moral standards are
capable of providing feelings of transcendence by binding people together into
tight-knit groups based on a common moral compass (Hogg, 2007; Hogg et al.
2010; Sedikides & Gebauer, 2010). People in such groups often feel as if they
have become “prototypical” group members, and in so doing, lose a sense of
personal identity, merge with their group identity, and experience a sense of
belonging to something greater than the individual self (Hogg, et al., 2010). Some
theorists (Grahm & Haidt, 2010) argue that groups become “moral communities”
bound together by common beliefs about what is set aside from the rest of human
behavior as forbidden (i.e. what is absolutely right or wrong, not just right or
wrong in a specific context; Grahm & Haidt, 2010; Durkheim, 1915/1962, p. 62).
These same theorists (Grahm & Haidt, 2010) argue along similar lines as social
identity theorists when they say that moral communities can provide a sense of
belonging to an entity greater than the sum of its parts. This body of work
suggests that feelings of affiliation and group synchrony fostered by shared moral
standards allow people to feel that they have merged with something higher than
the self (i.e. the group), providing feelings of transcendence.
Another way people experience a sense of transcendence through moral
standards is by instilling their own moral standards in their children. This can
foster symbolic immortality by assuring that a parent’s moral values are carried
on into the future, even after they have passed on (Lifton & Olson, 1974).
Instilling moral values in one’s children not only gives children rules to live by,
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but also allows people to feel as if they are serving a transcendent purpose greater
than the individual self by solidifying the virtue of future generations.
Moral vs. Conventional Standards and the Creation of Meaning
Moral standards may provide coherence more effectively than
conventional standards. Not only do moral standards create coherence, they may
do so more effectively than conventional standards. One reason for this is that
people do not experience conventional standards as objective and universal
(Skitka, 2010; Skitka et al., 2005). For example, this may be the case if a person
thinks that people should attend church because it is convention to unite people on
Sundays, but would be happy with other social engagements that serve the same
purpose (i.e., they do not experience church attendance as a moral standard). In
such instances, people will not dislike those who skip church, and may require
more deliberation about decisions on the extent to which they see skipping church
as right or wrong. Conversely, a person who holds their beliefs about church
attendance with moral conviction will always interpret the church attendance of
others as objectively and universally right or wrong. By viewing the behavior of
others in society through the lens of moral standards, one can easily come to
consistent judgments and predictions about others based on their behavior, and
make clear decisions about how to interact with them. Such quick moral
judgments may foster a since of coherence.
If one is attempting to find consistency, for example, by aligning their
opinion of a person with how that person adheres to conventions, it may be that
conventional standards create more consistency than moral standards. However,
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conventions are relative and one may be forced to deliberate to a greater extent
when deciding how to respond to changes in the environment. Moral standards
are experienced with immediacy and certainty, and may allow people to quickly
decide how to align their judgments and behavior with the environment. This
suggests that the uniformity and immediacy with which moral standards are
experienced makes them more able to provide coherence than conventional
standards.
Although compelling, the evidence suggesting that moral standards may
be an especially strong contributor to meaning in life is still quite preliminary. No
research to date has examined whether or not moral standards differ from
conventional standards in their ability to provide meaning in life, let alone a
specific dimension of meaning like coherence. For this reason, it is important to
conduct additional studies that specifically focus on the ability of moral standards
to provide feelings of meaning in life compared to social convention.
Moral standards may provide transcendence more effectively than
conventional standards. As in the case of coherence, preliminary evidence
suggests that morality may more effectively provide transcendence than social
convention. For example, a variety of theorists (Durkheim, 1925/1973; Freud
1923; Kohlberg, 1962; Nucci, 1982; Nucci & Turiel, 1993; Piaget, 1932) argue
that people experience moral standards as outweighing personal desires and
trumping the mandates of authority. For example, Durkheim (1925/1973) and
Freud (1923) suggest that moral standards are sets of norms that have been
internalized to the point that they are followed even in the absence of authority.
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Freud suggests that people follow their moral standards even when moral
behavior conflicts with the desire for ego-driven gain. Kohlberg and Piaget
suggest that people are willing to ignore the law and social conventions to adhere
to universal moral laws based on avoiding harming others, These arguments are
mirrored in studies of moral conviction that demonstrate that people will shirk
respected authority figures (Skitka & Houston, 2001) and are often willing to
break the law in the name of what they think is ultimately right (Skitka & Morgan,
2009). Examples of such moral convictions in real life can be observed in the
lives of such figures as Muhatma Ghandi and Martin Luther King, who risked
their safety and eventually their lives fighting in non-violent (and often illegal)
protest against injustices.
The fact that people are willing to jeopardize their safety and marginalize
themselves by breaking laws provides a hint that moral standards may provide
more meaning in life than conventional standards. If it were the case that
conventional standards were more capable of creating meaning than moral
standards, it seems that people would follow the law and live safe lives as
opposed to violating convention in the name of their moral standards. These
findings suggest that people feel that their moral standards take precedence over
their conventional standards, and are experienced with a sense of transcendence
that goes above and beyond ordinary laws. Broadly, the evidence presented above
suggests that by focusing on various aspects of life through a moral lens, people
may be able to experience a sense of both coherence and transcendence. Models
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of meaning in life (e.g., Heine et al., 2006) all contain descriptions of how
meaning is not only instilled in people, but also defended when it is under threat.
Compensation for Threats to Meaning
In addition to providing a framework for dimensions of meaning, the
Integrated Model of Meaning makes specific, novel predictions about how people
fluidly compensate for threats to meaning across dimensions of meaning. Fluid
compensation is a process in which people shore up meaning when it is threatened,
either directly, or by looking to an alternative aspect of meaning to compensate
(Heine et al., 2006). For example, if a person experiences criticism and a
subsequent reduction in self-esteem, they might try to compensate for this threat
directly by doing an activity that makes them feel good about themselves (i.e.
imporoves self-esteem, like volunteering for a charity (a within-components
compensatory strategy). Alternatively, they might compensate for the same threat
to meaning by increasing their sense of certainty about a belief (a betweencomponents compensatory strategy).
The Integrated Model of Meaning predicts, as do other theories (e.g.,
Stone, Weigand, Cooper, & Aaronson, 1997; Tullett, Teper, & Inzlicht, 2011),
that people prefer direct compensatory strategies when they are available, but that
they can also focus on alternative sources of meaning to indirectly compensate for
meaning threats. The Integrated Model of Meaning also predicts that people are
able to fluidly compensate within and across dimensions of meaning. For example,
if a person’s sense of coherence is threatened by unexpected circumstances, they
may restore meaning by looking to transcendent frameworks of meaning and
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interpret current unpredictability as parts of a greater plan that ultimately makes
sense.
Asymmetrical compensation across dimensions of meaning. In contrast
to the Meaning Maintenance Model’s predictions that components of meaning can
compensate interchangeably for damage to any other component, the Integrated
Model of Meaning predicts that although compensation between components of
meaning within a dimension may be interchangeable, compensation across
dimensions is asymmetrical. This asymmetry is the result of the idea that people
are able to look to either coherent or transcendent meaning to repair coherence
when a concretely construed component of meaning is threatened, but when the
entire framework of values and beliefs a person lives by is shattered (the
transcendent self), it is unlikely to do much good to focus on the predictable
everyday (i.e., coherent) routines he or she follows in order to restore
transcendence.
To illustrate, if a person is exposed to brief, situational incoherence, as is
the case in studies in which people are shown playing cards of mismatching suit
and color, they might simply assimilate the inconsistencies into the preexisting
schematic frameworks to restore coherence (Bruner & Postman, 1949). For
example, people who receive such an anomalous playing card might simply see a
heart as a spade to bring the suit of the card into alignment with its color. This
response would constitute a direct (i.e., a within-dimension) compensation
strategy. In situations of great unpredictability, such as war or social upheaval
when no sense of coherence is attainable, however, people might endorse broad
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(i.e., transcendent) ideologies to restore a sense of consistency (Proulx & Major,
2013), a key aspect of coherence. The broad construal at which such ideologies
operate may allow people to find meaning at transcendent levels of abstraction to
compensate for threats to coherence, and experience situational incoherence as
but one small part of a larger meaningful whole. In the face of extreme hardship
in a Nazi concentration camp, for example, Victor Frankl (1963) focused on the
greater individual purpose of his life and the dissemination of his work and life
story to maintain feelings of meaning and hope for the future. To the extent that a
person can turn to meaning operating in abstract construal, they may be able to
compensate for threats to meaning operating at lower levels of abstraction. In a
third case, a person might experience a threat to transcendence, possibly if they
learned the religious beliefs that guide their life’s work were misguided. In such
circumstances, it seems unlikely that it would to do much good create
predictability in the immediate physical environment (i.e., coherence), because
the structures of meaning that have been shattered operate at much higher levels
of construal and represent the overall purpose of existence. To repair such a threat,
people most likely have to turn to alternative transcendent frameworks of
meaning to restore purpose.
Overall, the theoretical perspective outlined above suggests that people
can compensate for threats to coherence by shoring up either coherence or
transcendence, but seeking transcendence can more effectively compensate for
threats to transcendence than seeking coherence. It is also important to note that
the asymmetrical nature of compensation proposed above does not suggest that
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there are distinct stages of meaning, as implied by some theorists (e.g., Maslow,
1943). For example, it is possible for a person with a life characterized by
incoherence (e.g., poverty and unpredictability) at present to still feel
transcendence if they thought their circumstances were preparing them for a
greater overall life purpose, or if they were helping others in a similar plight. This
means that coherence is not necessary for a person to experience transcendence,
and one does not need to experience lower levels of meaning to reach more
abstract levels. It does mean, however, that meaning operating at high levels of
construal might more universally compensate for threats to meaning, whereas
meaning operating at low levels of construal may most effectively compensate for
threats to meaning operating at similar levels of construal. In light of these
additional arguments, it is important to examine the ways in which moral
standards may protect meaning construed as both coherence and transcendence
respectively.
Moral Standards Protect Meaning
The predictions made by the Integrated Model of Meaning have
implications for the manner in which moral standards protect threatened meaning.
Focusing on moral standards may be more effective at compensating for threats to
meaning than focusing on other types of standards, like social convention, as
suggested by research demonstrating that people hold their beliefs about absolute
right and wrong (i.e., moral beliefs), with a sense of objectivity and universality
(Skitka et al., 2005), and feelings of sacredness (Haidt, 2003; Haidt & Algoe,
2004) that may border on the transcendent. If coherence is threatened, for
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example, a person might first try to compensate for threats to meaning by
restoring coherence. To the extent that moral standards are a strong source of
coherence, people may look to moral standards to a greater extent than
conventional standards to restore such a sense of coherence. However, if
transcendence is threatened, it may be less effective to look to standards that more
uniquely relate to coherence, like conventional standards, as a compensatory
strategy. From these ideas one can ascertain that people will prefer to compensate
for threats to meaning by endorsing the type of standard most closely tied to the
dimension of meaning under threat. Based on this idea, I suggest that endorsing
standards associated with coherence or transcendence (i.e., either conventional or
moral standards) can remedy threats to coherence (although moral standards may
be more effective), but transcendence threats may be more effectively remedied
by shoring up standards strongly tied to transcendence (i.e., moral standards).
Moral standards may be very effective not only at providing meaning, but
at compensating for threatened meaning in life. For example, people who
experience threats to meaning, such as feelings of uncertainty (Van den bos,
2001) and thoughts of death (Greenberg et al., 1990), become more likely to
endorse cultural worldviews (which some theorists suggest are connected to
feelings of symbolic immortality) associated with moral standards (e.g., assigning
higher bond for crimes; Greenberg et al., 1990). These examples provide vague
preliminary evidence that people turn to moral standards to restore a sense of
coherence when frameworks that create certainty are threatened, and to restore
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transcendence when people are reminded of the ultimate end (and potentially the
ultimate purposelessness) of life.
Moral compensation for threats to coherence. Research suggests that
people compensate for threats to coherence by adhering zealously to threatened
beliefs by focusing on moral standards. Early research on belief disconfirmation
describes how threats to the certainty of cult member’s beliefs of the coming of a
UFO lead them to endorse their beliefs with an even greater strength (Festinger
1954), which at lest appears similar to the moral zeal often demonstrated by
people whose certainty is threatened (McGregor, 2006). The cult dealt with
difficult fact that aliens had not come to retrieve them through the rationalization
that their proselytizing had saved the earth. Although this work does not explicitly
draw the conclusion that these rationalizations were based on moral standards, it
seems likely that at least some of the reason they were effective was because they
were related to helping, a likely candidate for a moral standard. Recent
experimental evidence replicates these observations by demonstrating that people
proselytize on behalf of their beliefs when they are disconfirmed as a way of
restoring certainty (Gal & Rucker, 2010). Overall, these results suggest that
people may reaffirm their moral standards when their certainty is violated to
restore coherence.
Evidence suggests that people invoke morality to compensate for threats to
coherence arising from perceptions that they do not behave in ways that are
consistent with their beliefs. When people complete a pointless and repetitive task
and view a confederate quit the same task, for example, they are more likely to
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see their own actions as moral than in a condition in which the faux participant
perseveres, an effect that disappears when they are able to affirm their self worth
(Monin & Jordan, 2009). The perception that one has behaved in a way they
realize is not how they would have wanted seems like a potential threat to
coherence, and if this is the case, these may effects suggest that people respond to
threats to coherence with biased interpretations of their adherence to moral
standards. Similarly, evidence suggests that people who realize that they have
behaved poorly bias their moral self-evaluations, increasing self-flattering
information or putting down others (Jordan & Monin, 2008). People behave
similarly in the presence of people of high ethical stature, a situation that
decreases positive self-evaluations and may cause feelings of inadequacy
(Higgins, 1987), by focusing on moral self regard and resenting ethically superior
others (Monin, 2007). These results suggest focusing on ones own moral
standards by interpreting events as consistent with expectations may restore
coherence.
Moral compensation for threats to transcendence. People are
sometimes placed in situations, such as warfare, that threaten their sense of
transcendence and lead them to behave in ways inconsistent with the legacy they
want to leave behind. For example, American-born Vietnam veterans often
returned home to the United States feeling they had committed an injustice.
People placed in such situations may focus on moral frameworks to restore
transcendence. Soldiers fighting and killing their enemies often do not change
their conceptions of right and wrong to adapt to the fact they are violating a
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commonly held moral standard (that one should not kill) but redefine their actions
so that the act of killing fits into their preexisting moral standards (e.g., protecting
loved ones, fighting evildoers; Bandura, 1999; Kelman, 1973). The social
cognitive theory of moral behavior (Bandura, 1999) suggests that people apply
euphemistic labeling to violent or reprehensible acts, such as calling bombing
raids “surgical strikes,” civilian deaths “collateral damage,” or the execution of
criminals “recognition of the sanctity of human life” (Bandura, 1999; Gambino,
1973). Such moral reasoning may allow people to protect their belief that their
acts in life will serve the greater good and restore feelings of transcendence.
Moral standards compensate for threats to meaning more effectively
than conventional standards. Preliminary evidence suggests that moral
standards are more effective than conventional standards in compensating for
threats to meaning. For example, social identity theorists suggest that
unsuccessful groups might view themselves with a high degree of moral fortitude
as an alternative to positive evaluation from others (e.g., Blanz, Mummendey, &
Otten, 1995; Ellemers & Van Rijswijk, 1997). These findings suggest that people
repair meaning after it is damaged by threats to group affiliation based on not
upholding social or conventional standards by interpreting affiliation through a
moral lens. This moral lens may protect coherence by allowing people to interpret
events to suggest that that they are especially representative of their group, and
interpreting group characteristics to suggest that their group adheres to moral
standards. The observation that these groups do not attempt to shore up positive
evaluations instead of moral evaluations suggests that morality is a more desired
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and potentially more effective compensatory strategy than looking to alternative
angles of group perceptions.
There is very little evidence to my knowledge that suggests that moral
standards compensate for threats to transcendence to a greater extent than
conventional standards. It seems intuitive that this would be the case, however,
because people experience their moral standards as objective and sacred.
Conventional standards can be changed more easily than moral standards (if
moral standards can be changed at all) and do not invoke feelings of objective
truth. Hence, conventional standards may be less effective than moral standards at
restoring an overall sense of purpose under threat. To the extent that one has to
consider whether or not an action is appropriate (as is the case with convention)
conventions may be less effective at repairing transcendence than morals, which
give immediate guidance as to whether or not something is right or wrong. It may
be the case that conventional standards not only do not compensate for threats to
transcendence as effectively as moral standards, but that conventional standards
do not contribute to transcendence to a large extent in general.
Rationale and Hypotheses
Psychological research has examined meaning in terms of consistency and
predictability that aids in survival, as well as in terms of feelings of greater
purpose in life. Research on meaning has not only examined people’s feelings of
consistency and purpose, but also how people defend these feelings of meaning
once they are established. Additional research suggests that moral standards are
related to constructs that have been theoretically related to meaning in life.
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However, no research has specifically examined factors that allow people to
effectively create and defend meaning at both concrete and abstract levels of
construal. Finally, no research has examined whether or not people compensate
for threats to meaning most effectively by focusing on components of meaning at
an equal or greater level of construal than the meaning under threat.
Goals of the Current Investigation
The purpose of the present investigation was to expand upon the previous
meaning literature in four ways.

1. The current investigation expanded on previous investigations of
meaning by examining whether moral standards are more effective at
providing meaning than conventional standards.

2. This work assessed whether endorsing moral standards are more
effective than conventional standards at providing meaning within and
across the dimensions of coherence and transcendence, proposed by
Wetherell (unpublished manuscript).

3. The current investigation examined whether or not endorsing moral
standards is especially effective at compensating for threats to meaning
compared to endorsing conventional standards.
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4. The current investigation examined whether the overall advantage
moral standards have in providing both coherence and transcendence
compared to convention is especially large for transcendence.

The rationale described above can be organized into two overarching sets
of predictions. The first set of predictions examined whether endorsing moral
standards in terms of both coherence and transcendence provides meaning to a
greater extent than endorsing conventional standards

Hypothesis I The Moral Primacy Hypothesis predicts a main effect of
type of standards, such that participants will endorse moral standards as
providing more meaning than conventional standards

Moral standards may be more effective at providing coherence and
transcendence than conventional standards, but moral standards are most likely
also experienced in terms of abstract construal (i.e., transcendence) to a greater
extent than conventional standards. Hence, moral standards may be even more
effective in providing transcendence than coherence compared to conventional
standards.

Hypothesis II: The Fit Hypothesis predicts a Type of Standard ×
Construal Level interaction, such that domain endorsement will depend on how
well it fits the situational construal. Specifically, participants will more strongly
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endorse moral standards as providing meaning in high-level (abstract) than lowlevel (concrete) framing conditions; conversely, participants will more strongly
endorse conventional standards as providing meaning in low-level (concrete) than
high-level (abstract) framing conditions. (see Figure 1).

Level of Endorsement

Figure 1: Predicted results from Study 1
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1
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A further derivation of this first set of predictions is that activating states
of concrete vs. abstract construal will affect the extent to which endorsing moral
and conventional standards will differentially provide coherence and
transcendence. That is, endorsing moral standards should be more effective in
creating coherence and transcendence than conventional standards overall,
however this difference should be greater for transcendence, but these patterns
will be qualified by the construal level in which a person is operating (abstract vs.
concrete).
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Hypothesis III: Integrating the foregoing with the assumption that moral
standards are more likely than conventional standards to be perceived as
applicable across a wide variety of contexts yields the Asymmetry
Hypothesis. This hypothesis predicts a Type of Standard × Construal
Level × Dimension of Meaning interaction. such that the morality
advantage predicted by the Moral Primacy Hypothesis should be more
pronounced in high-level (abstract) than low-level (concrete) framing
condition. This hypothesis predicts that in states of concrete construal
moral standards will provide more coherence and transcendence than
convention, but this will be especially the case for coherence. In states of
abstract construal morality will create more coherence and transcendence
than convention, but this will be especially the case for transcendence (see
Figure 2).

To address the second set of predictions, the current proposal will test how
people respond to threats to meaning. Specifically, I will test whether or not
people endorse moral
standards to a greater extent than conventional standards both generally and after

	
  

	
  

Figure 2: Predicted results from Study 2
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threats to coherence and transcendence. To the extent that endorsing moral
standards provides powerful structure and predictability as well as broad and
transcendent meaning, people may endorse moral standards to restore threatened
meaning, particularly transcendent meaning.

Hypothesis IV: People will endorse both conventional and moral
standards to a greater extent after an induction of threats to meaning
compared to a neutral condition.

Furthermore, because moral standards are proposed to be more effective in
compensating for both threats to coherence and transcendence because of their
objective, universal, and sacred nature, people may be more likely to endorse
moral compared to conventional standards after threats in general.

Hypothesis V: To the extent that moral standards are more generally able
to allay threats to meaning than conventional standards, the main effect of
threat in Hypothesis IV will be qualified by type of standard; People will
endorse moral standards to a much greater extent than conventional
standards after induction of threats to meaning in general, compared to a
neutral condition, in which people will endorse moral standards more than
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conventional standards, but to a lesser extent. This pattern is depicted in
Figure 3.

Figure 3: Predicted Results From Study 3.

Finally, the current investigation tested whether or not moral standards are not
only endorsed more frequently than conventional standards after threats, but if
moral standards are especially able to compensate for threats to transcendence.
Coherence operates at low levels of construal and people may endorse moral
standards compared to conventional standards to shore up coherence or
transcendence. This may be an effective strategy because people may be able to
compensate for threats to meaning in general by looking to more abstract meaning.
In addition, moral standards are likely to operate at a higher level of abstraction
than conventional standards. Hence, following transcendence threats, people may
especially endorse moral compared to conventional standards to restore
transcendence.
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Hypothesis VI: When coherence is threatened, participants will endorse
moral standards to a greater extent than conventional standards, but no
differences in endorsement will occur in a neutral condition. However,
when transcendence is threatened, participants will endorse moral
standards to a much greater extent than conventional standards, but no
difference will emerge in a neutral condition (see Figure 3).

Study 1 Overview

The purpose of Study 1 was to test the prediction that people endorse
moral standards more than conventional standards to create coherence and
transcendence. Study 1 also tested the idea that moral standards create much more
coherence than transcendence compared to conventional standards. In order to test
these hypotheses, participants responded to items assessing the extent to which
they endorse moral and conventional standards as providing both coherence and
transcendence. In both the conventional and moral standard scales, there are items
to measure the extent to which conventional and moral standards provide
coherence and transcendence; and are geared towards assessing the extent to
which each type of standard provides feelings of predictability and certainty in the
environment. Items measuring the extent to which conventional and moral
standards provide transcendence are geared towards assessing the extent to which
each type of standard provides feelings that life has an overall purpose.
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To test the validity of these newly created items I also included measures

to examine convergent and discriminant validity. These scales included the
Behavior Identification Form (Vallacher & Wegner, 1989), and a short, Need for
Closure Scale (Roets & Van Heil, 2011).
As a measure of criterion validity, I included a measure of meaning in life
(the presence of meaning subscale from The Meaning in Life Questionnaire
[MLQ], Steger, Frasier, Oishi & Kaler, 2006), and the Sense of Coherence Scale
(SOC; Antonovski, 1993). The SOC includes three items geared towards
measuring meaning in life that correspond to transcendence (marked with an
asterisk in Appendix G; e.g., Until now, your life has had… no clear goals or
purpose at all/very clear goals and purpose”).
Study 1 Hypotheses
Study 1 is based on two primary sets of tests. The first set examines the
moral primacy and asymmetry hypotheses. The expected patterns reflected by
these hypotheses (relevant only to Hypotheses I and II) are depicted in Figure 1.
The second set of tests, which are exploratory, provides a brief examination of the
properties of the coherence and transcendence scales including five steps to
explore the factor structure of these scales. The second set of tests also examines
the convergent, discriminant, and criterion validity of the coherence and
transcendence measures.

Primary Hypotheses: Tests of the Moral Primacy and Asymmetry
Hypotheses.
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Hypothesis I. There will be a main effect of type of standard. When
endorsing the extent to which moral and conventional standards provide
coherence and transcendence, participants will endorse moral standards as
providing both coherence and transcendence to a greater extent than
conventional standards.

Hypothesis II. The main effect of type of standard will be qualified by
dimension of meaning (coherence vs. transcendence), such that
participants will endorse moral standards as providing much more
transcendence than convention, and as providing slightly more coherence
than convention (see Figure 1).
Exploratory Analyses: Predictions for Scale Exploration.
Part I. The items measuring the extent to which moral standards provide
coherence and transcendence, and the items measuring the extent to which
conventional standards provide coherence and transcendence, will load
onto separate factors. This will result in factors representing the extent to
which endorsing conventional standards provides coherence and
transcendence, and the extent to which endorsing moral standards provides
coherence and transcendence.
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Part II. Based on the theoretical perspective that coherence operates at a
lower level of construal than transcendence, the Behavior Identification
Form will negatively relate to endorsement of moral and conventional
standards as providing coherence, and positively relate to endorsement of
moral and conventional standards as providing transcendence.

Part III. The measures of endorsement of moral and conventional
standards as providing coherence should positively relate to the preference
for order, preference for predictability, and discomfort with ambiguity
(subscales of the Need for Closure Scale). The measures of endorsement
of moral and conventional standards as providing transcendence should
positively relate to open-mindedness (a subscale of the Need for Closure
Scale).

Part IV. The Sense of Coherence (SOC) scale items measuring coherence
should positively relate to endorsement of moral and conventional
standards as providing coherence, and the SOC items measuring
transcendence will positively relate to endorsement of moral and
conventional standards as providing transcendence.

Part V. The presence of meaning subscale of the MLQ should relate
positively to endorsement of moral and conventional standards as
providing transcendence.
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Study 1 Method
Participants
There were 590 participants in Study 1 (NMen = 231; NWomen = 357; 2
failed to report) who completed an online survey through Amazon.com’s
Mechanical Turk. Mechanical Turk is an online service through which people can
pay workers small sums of money to complete simple tasks, such as online studies.
Participants were paid 50 cents.
Procedure and Measures
In Study 1, participants signed up for the study on Amazon.com’s
Mechanical Turk online interface and received a link to the survey materials. First,
participants completed either a measure of endorsement of conventional or moral
standards as providers of meaning. The remainder of the survey materials was
fully randomized, such that each separate, complete measure was assigned in a
random order to all participants.
To create a survey layout allowing me to assess the extent to which
morality and convention create coherence and transcendence, I first had
participants read prompts asking them to write briefly about some of the moral or
conventional standards they follow in their lives. They then rated their agreement
with statements assessing the extent to which they endorse moral or conventional
standards. Participants always responded to questions about conventional
standards after writing about their conventional standards and always responded
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to questions about moral standards after writing about their moral standards. The
demographics always came last.
Prompts for morality and convention measures. To measure the extent
that endorsing moral and conventional standards provides a sense of both
coherence and transcendence, participants completed a series of scales assessing
the extent to which they endorse conventional and moral standards they
commonly adhere to as providing both coherence and transcendence. Before
completing these scales, participants read a prompt orienting them to either
respond to their feelings about conventional or moral standards (see Appendices
A and B for example responses from participants):

Conventional Standards Prompt
All people follow conventions in one form or another. Conventions are standard
practices that are commonly followed in a particular society. Conventions can
vary from place to place, and when a person experiences a standard as
conventional, they see it as applying differently from one society to another based
on the customs of the society in question and the social situation at hand.

For example, in some countries, people drive on the right side of the road, but in
others, they drive on the left side of the road. Some cultures eat with chopsticks
and others eat with forks and spoons, and in some countries it is customary to
consult family members when selecting a marriage partner, but in other countries
it is not. The people that engage in these acts often see them as conventional,
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meaning that they follow them only because it is the norm to do so. As a result,
people do not see the standards of behavior described by their conventions as
absolutely right or wrong, and will often adjust their conventions when in
different situations. Despite this, people can get annoyed or offended when others
violate their conventional norms.

We would like you to please spend a few minutes to write a paragraph about some
of the conventions you frequently follow that fit the description of conventions
given in the first paragraph above. Please try to think of the conventions you
abide by on a daily basis and give an example of how they affect your behavior on
a day-to-day basis.

Moral Standards Prompt
All people follow morals in one form or another. Morals are beliefs and standards
that a person sees as representing what is absolutely right or wrong. This means
that morals are experienced as representing what is absolutely right or wrong in
all societies and situations regardless of the laws or customs of a given place.

For example, some people feel that everyone has the right to move from one
economic class to another through hard work, and would think it unjust to deny
opportunities for success based on arbitrary things like gender or skin color.
Some people adhere to specific diets because they think eating certain foods (e.g.,
pork) is immoral, and others feel morally invested in political issues like gun
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control or same-sex marriage. Because morals are seen as absolutely right or
wrong regardless of the context, people are deeply invested in their morals, and
feel angry at, and disgusted by, people who violate their morals.

We would like you to please spend a few minutes to write a paragraph about some
of your own morals that fit the description of morals given in the first paragraph
above. Please try to think of the morals you abide by on a daily basis and give an
example of how they affect your behavior on a day-to-day basis.

In these prompts, participants were given a definition of either moral or
conventional standards. They were then asked to write a paragraph describing
some of the conventions they abide by in everyday life, or some of the moral
standards they abide by in everyday life. Then, following the prompt, participants
responded to questions about the extent to which the conventional or moral
standards they follow provide both coherence and transcendence.
Responses to the conventional and moral standard scales. After
reading the conventional and moral standards prompts and completing the writing
activity, participants completed a series of scales assessing the extent to which
conventional or moral standards provide coherence and transcendence (see
Appendix C). These scales were created to tap into the construct of coherence by
assessing the extent to which conventional and moral standards create certainty,
predictability, and safety, which are all aspects of coherence proposed by previous
theorists (Wetherell, unpublished manuscript). These items also tap into the extent
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to which convention creates a sense of coherence in participants across areas of
life that provide meaning proposed by previous theorists (Heine et al, 2006). All
items were rated on a 1 = not at all to 7 = very much scale in which participants
rated the extent to which having conventional and moral standards to abide by
provides coherence and transcendence. The measure included items designed to
tap into each dimension of meaning (e.g. coherence” “The conventions I follow in
my daily life… Enable me to create a structured mode of life”; e.g. transcendence
“Make me feel that my day to day routine contributes to something greater than
myself). As noted at the bottom of Appendix C, the concrete and abstract
measures of coherence and transcendence include items to assess components of
meaning proposed by previous theorists (Heine et al., 2006; i.e. certainty,
belonging, self-esteem, and symbolic immortality). The items measuring both
coherence (α = .90) and transcendence (α = .96) showed good internal reliability.
Behavior Identification Form. To assess the extent to which participants
have a general tendency to operate in a state of concrete compared to abstract
construal, they responded to the Behavior Identification Form (Appendix E;
Vallacher & Wegner, 1989; α = .86) which assesses the extent to which people
chronically focus on low (performing simple actions to complete a task) or highlevel, abstract goals (the overall reason for completing a task), with higher values
on this scale representing higher level goals. In the BIF, participants chose one of
two options that best represents their views of a variety of actions. For example, if
a participant classified “making a list” as “getting organized” as opposed to
“writing things down” the response would be considered indicative of abstract
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construal. Conversely, if the participant chose “writing things down” as opposed
to “getting organized” the action would be classified as concrete construal. To the
extent that moral and conventional coherence and transcendence operate at lower
and higher levels of construal, they should negatively and positively correlate
with the BIF respectively. This would provide convergent evidence suggesting
that the newly created scales measuring meaning from morality and convention at
high and low levels of construal do in fact capture meaning at these respective
levels of construal.
Short Need for Closure Scale. Participants completed a shortened Need
for Closure Scale (Roets & Van Heil, 2011; see Appendix F; α = .78), with items
measuring the extent to which participants are open-minded, prefer order,
predictability, and dislike ambiguity. The items were rated on a 1 = strongly
disagree to 7 = strongly agree scale. Example items include “I find that a well
ordered life with regular hours suits my temperament” and “I do not usually
consult many different opinions before forming my own view.” The Need for
Closure Scale allowed me to assess whether or not the coherence and
transcendence items correlated in an expected fashion with items tapping into a
desire to make quick and coherent decisions, providing convergent validity.
Sense of Coherence Scale (SOC). Participants completed a short version
of Antonovski’s (1993; α = .86) Sense of Coherence Scale (see Appendix G).
This scale measures a global orientation capturing feelings of confidence that
events make sense and that one has the resources to cope with them. The measure
was completed on 1 to 7 scales with the response anchors varying based on the
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question. Example items include “Do you have the feeling that you are in an
unfamiliar situation and don’t know what to do?” (1 = very often, 7 = very seldom
or never). To the extent that the moral and conventional coherence scales are valid
measures of the extent to which morality and convention create coherence, they
should positively correlate with the SOC scale.
Meaning in Life Questionnaire (MLQ). Participants completed the
Meaning in Life Questionnaire (Steger et al., 2006; α = .92) to measure the extent
to which they feel purpose in their lives (see Appendix H). This scale consists of
five items on a 1 = absolutely untrue to 7 = absolutely true scale assessing the
extent to which people feel a broad sense of meaning in life (e.g. “I have
discovered a satisfying life purpose”). To the extent that the measures of moral
and conventional coherence and transcendence capture the extent to which people
feel coherence and transcendence in these domains respectively, they should
positively relate to feelings of meaning in life. To the extent that the morality and
convention create feelings of transcendence, the moral and conventional
transcendence scales should be especially predictive of the MLQ scale.
Demographics. Finally, participants responded to a series of demographic
measures, such as age, sex, political orientation, income, and religious orientation
and religious strength (see Appendix I)

Study 1 Results
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There were two overarching goals of the first study. The first goal,

corresponding to the primary hypotheses, was to test whether there is a main
effect of type of standard, such that moral standards create more coherence and
transcendence than conventional standards, and an interaction between type of
standard and dimension of meaning, such that morality creates more coherence
than convention, and much more transcendence than convention. The secondary
goal, (which corresponds to the scale exploration) was to explore the factor
structure, convergent, discriminant, and criterion validity of the coherence and
transcendence scales for morality and convention. To accomplish these goals, I
first used the original, a-priori scales to test the interaction between dimension of
meaning and type of standard, corresponding to the primary study hypotheses. I
then conducted the scale analyses to examine the behavior of the coherent and
transcendent standards scales.
Tests of the Primary Hypotheses
Pilot test. Before collecting the full sample from Mturk, I conducted a
short pilot test (N = 48, on Mturk) to make sure that participants responded to the
prompts for conventional and moral standards in the expected fashion. I examined
the written responses to the prompts to assess whether or not people described
moral and conventional standards distinctly. Participants also responded to
questions (see Appendix D) to assess whether or not the conventions or morals
they wrote about have the characteristics of conventional or moral standards.
These questions tapped into the authority independence, sense of objectivity and
universality, and strong emotions that characterize how people experience their
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moral standards, and were coded so that higher numbers represent moral
standards (i.e. objective, universal, sacred, and emotionally laden standards). The
results presented in Table 1 show that participants consistently rated their morals
as more objective, universal, and emotionally charged than their conventions.
These results demonstrate that the writing prompt was successful in
differentiating between morals and conventions.
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Table 1: Results From Study 1 Pilot Test

I think that other people should follow the
[conventions/morals] I just wrote about in all situations.
The [conventions/morals] I just wrote about are no more
important than any of my other beliefs.
The [conventions/morals] I just wrote about are sacred to
me.
Even if it were against the law, I would follow the
conventions I just wrote about.
The [conventions/morals] I just wrote about represent what
I think is absolutely right or wrong.
There is nothing special about the [conventions/morals] I
just wrote about.
I would be willing to change the [conventions/morals] that
I just wrote about if I was in a situation in which other
people wanted me to.
When people violate the [conventions/morals] I just wrote
about I do not usually get angry with them.
When people violate the [conventions/morals] I just wrote
about I am disgusted with them.
I feel that the [conventions/morals] I just wrote about are
sacred.
I would change the [conventions/morals] I just wrote about
if I were in another country where people have different
beliefs.

t

Mmoral

SD

Mconvention

SD

2.72**

5.31

1.74

3.82

2.06

3.12**

2.77

1.70

4.41

1.95

2.71**

4.96

1.95

3.41

2.02

2.83**

4.92

2.12

3.27

1.88

3.30**

5.04

1.93

3.27

1.75

4.03***

2.54

1.36

4.55

2.06

3.30**

2.08

1.29

3.64

1.97

4.16***

3.12

1.64

5.27

1.91

3.67***

5.12

1.70

3.18

1.94

2.88**

4.96

1.87

3.38

1.88

2.76**

2.42

1.70

3.86

1.91

Note: Participants in Study 1 wrote about either their conventional or moral standards. The wording of each item
either asked about conventional or moral standards. +p<.10, *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001
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Hypotheses I and II. To test hypotheses I and II, I ran a 2 between (Type of
Standard; moral vs. conventional) by 2 within (Dimension of Meaning: coherence
vs. transcendence) mixed ANOVA. I used the original scales designed to measure
coherent and transcendent conventional and moral standards. Consistent with
hypotheses, there was a main effect of type of standard F (1, 531) = 55.29, p
<.001, ηp2 = .002, such that moral standards were a greater source of coherence
and transcendence than conventional standards. Consistent with predictions, there
was a significant interaction between type of standard and dimension of meaning
F (1,531) = 62.26, p < .001, ηp2 = .09. This interaction is depicted in Figure 4.
Simple effects tests demonstrated that participants rated moral standards as a
greater source of coherence than conventional standards F (1, 531) = 25.54, p
< .001, ηp2 = .05. Consistent with hypotheses, this pattern was even greater for
transcendence, F (1, 531) = 73.54, p < .001, ηp2 = .12. Also consistent with
hypotheses, moral standards were a greater source of transcendence than
coherence F (1, 531) = 26.12, p < .01, ηp2 = .05. In addition, conventional
standards were rated as providing more coherence than transcendence F (1, 531)
= 36.18 p < .001, ηp2 = .06.
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Figure 4: Results from Study 1.
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Scale Exploration
After conducting the primary analyses, I next conducted scale exploration.
The primary hypotheses were confirmed with the a-priori scales based in my
theoretical perspective. Hence the goal of this exploration is to provide an initial
test of the factor structure of these scale, and potential evidence for convergent
and divergent validity, and not to assess whether or not the patterns from the
primary hypotheses differences in coherence and transcendence.
Part I. To test Part I of the scale exploration 1, I ran two separate
exploratory factor analyses using principle axis factoring and direct-oblimin
rotation. I expected a two-factor solution within the moral and conventional
standard writing conditions differentiating between the items capturing
conventional standards and the items capturing moral standards. This analysis
failed to converge across several attempts because of serious issues of
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multicollinearity. For this reason it was not possible to examine Part 1 of the scale
analyses
Part II. To examine Part II of the exploratory scale analyses, I examined
correlations between the BIF and the full measures of coherence and
transcendence across the morality and convention conditions (see Table 2 for the
correlations from Hypotheses II to VI). In all further analyses, I examined
coherence and transcendence by averaging all the a-priori coherence and
transcendence items into separate scales. The BIF, with higher numbers
representing broader construal, was positively correlated with coherence, and
positively correlated to a slightly larger extent with transcendence.
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Table 2: Correlations from Study 1 Scale Analyses Parts II Though V.
4

6

7

9

2

3

-.81***
.13**

-.20***

--

Openmindedness
Need for order
and structure
Discomfort with
ambiguity
Preference for
predictability
SOC coherence
SOC
transcendence
MLQ

-.16***

-.17***

-.21***

--

.36***

.33***

.14***

-.06

--

.16***

.11***

.04

-.03

.36***

--

.34***

.27***

.09*

.10*

.50***

.56***

--

.14***
.26***

.18***
.36***

.14***
.23***

-.12**
-.16***

.12**
.21***

-.20***
-.06

-.07
.02

-.64***

--

.32***

.39***

.16***

-.10*

.18***

-.04

-.01

.48***

.68***

Note: +p<.10, *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001

5

8

1
Coherence
Transcendence
BIF

10

--
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Part III. To test convergent and discriminant validity, I examined the
correlations between coherence and transcendence, and each subscale of the need
for closure measure. Both coherence and transcendence were positively related to
need for structure, discomfort with ambiguity, and preference for predictability.
Coherence exhibited larger correlations with these measures, but to a very small
extent. Oddly, coherence and transcendence were equally negatively correlated
with open-mindedness.
Part IV. To test the criterion validity of the coherence items, as well as
provide an additional test of convergent and discriminant validity, I examined the
correlations between coherence and transcendence, and the items in the SOC
measuring coherence and transcendence. All correlations were positive. Counter
to expectations, the correlations between the full coherence and transcendence
scales and the SOC coherence items appeared weaker than the correlations
between the SOC transcendence items and coherence and transcendence. There
appeared to be a larger correlation between the SOC transcendence items and
transcendence than the SOC transcendence items and coherence.
Part V. To examine Part V and examine the criterion validity of the
transcendence items, as well as provided additional tests of convergent and
discriminant validity, I examined the correlations between coherence and
transcendence and the MLQ. The MLQ was positively related to both coherence
and transcendence, with a slightly higher correlation with transcendence as
expected.
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Study 1 Discussion

Test of the Primary Hypotheses
The results of Study 1 showed strong results for the primary hypotheses.
Moral standards provided more coherence and transcendence than conventional
standards, and the difference between transcendence and coherence was
especially large for moral standards. These results suggest that moral standards
are a powerful source of meaning in life. In addition, these results suggest that
moral standards are an especially powerful source of transcendent meaning, and
that they allow people to feel that their lives have a greater purpose than meets the
eye. The results of Study 1 thus lend credence to both the moral primacy and
asymmetry hypotheses.
The results for Study 1 also map onto the theoretical perspective presented
in this paper suggesting that the objective and universal characteristics of moral
standards provide meaning, especially transcendence. Although I did not
explicitly include items examining the objective and universal experience of
moral standards alongside the coherence and transcendence scales in Study 1, the
results of the pilot test suggest that participants experienced their moral standards
as objective and universal. In combination, the pilot test and primary analyses
map onto the theoretical perspective that the objective and universal
characteristics of moral standards provide more meaning overall, and especially
transcendence, than conventional standards. Further research could provide more
explicit tests of this idea by including measures of objectivity and universality,
and testing whether or not they mediate the relationship between type of standard,
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coherence and transcendence. In addition, the idea that the objective and universal
characteristics of moral standards provide may have interesting implications for
existing research. It may be the case that the (sometimes) extreme behaviors
people endorse on behalf of their moral beliefs in the extant literature (e.g.,Skitka
& Houston, 2001) are motivated by a sense of objective meaning provided by
morals.
I found partial support for Part II through V of the scale analyses
examining the convergent and discriminant validity of the coherence and
transcendence measures. The scales expected to correlate positively with
coherence did positively correlate with coherence, and the items expected to
positively correlate with transcendence correlated positively with transcendence.
However, there were positive correlations between all measures, which was not
expected, and in most cases these correlations were not much different from one
another in magnitude, limiting the discriminant validity of the coherence and
transcendence scales.
The mixed support for Part II through VI of the scale analyses may also
have one or more explanations. Overall, there were positive correlations between
both the coherence and transcendence scales. It is possible that participants
viewed the items assessing coherence and transcendence as a single unit. That is,
participants may have felt all the coherence and transcendence items were in fact
measuring a one-dimensional construct of meaning. At second glance, this high
correlation between coherence and transcendence was not surprising, as one
would expect that strongly held standards provide a strong sense of
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meaningfulness in multiple ways, and should thus be correlated highly. This also
provides some support for the assertion of the integrated model of meaning that
people may use one dimension of meaning (e.g., coherence) as a springboard to
create the other (e.g., transcendence).
From this perspective, it is also not surprising that the items designed to
measure both coherence and transcendence correlated reliably and positively with
the scales included to assess convergent, discriminant, and criterion validity. To
the extent that the measures of coherent and transcendent moral standards capture
a sense of meaningfulness, they should both relate to measures capturing
consistency and predictability (e.g. the SOC) and scales assessing a broader sense
of meaningfulness (e.g. The MLQ). In addition, there should be some overlap
between coherence and transcendence; especially if it is the case that
transcendence provides a degree of coherence. For this reason, it is not surprising
that both coherence and transcendence measures both positively predicted the BIF.
The pattern of correlations for Part II through V of the scale analyses may
not be surprising for another reason as well. The validation scales designed to
capture transcendence (i.e. the MLQ and the SOC transcendence items) seemed to
correlate a bit more strongly with the scale assessing the dimension of
transcendence than the items measuring the dimension of coherence. The scale
designed to measure the dimension of coherence and the dimension of
transcendence seemed to correlate more or less equally with the Need for Closure
Scale dimensions and the SOC coherence items. This may be in line with the
asymmetry hypothesis that transcendence serves to provide coherence. To the
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extent that people have standards that provide them with a sense of transcendence,
these standards should provide high levels of coherence, which may explain the
equal correlations of the coherence and transcendence dimensions with the facets
of need for closure and the soc coherence items. However having standards that
provide coherence should not lead people to experience the broader sense of
meaning measured in the MLQ and SOC transcendence items.
In order to provide additional clarity to these results, there are additional
analytic strategies and methodological changes that may be incorporated into
future research. First, because of the high correlation between the coherent and
transcendent dimension scales, it may be wise to present them to participants
separately, as opposed to as a unit. If participants respond to the items assessing
each dimension of meaning as separate units, they may respond to the coherent
and transcendent dimensions in a way that taps into each respective dimension
more reliably. It may also be worth counterbalancing the scales to assess whether
the presentation of one dimension first leads to a higher correlation between the
measures. To the extent that the asymmetry hypothesis is correct, it may be the
case that allowing participants to complete the transcendence measure first (and
potentially affirm feelings of transcendence) will lead to a stronger correlation
with coherence.
It may also be wise to consider additional analytic strategies in which the
coherent and transcendent dimension scales are included in models
simultaneously to account for their shared variance, leaving only the unique
variability associated with each dimension of meaning. If one were to predict each
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dimension of meaning with each additional validation scale (e.g. NFC, the MLQ
and SOC), clearer patterns may emerge.
Overall, the results of Study 1 suggest that people derive a strong sense of
meaning from their moral standards, and that moral standards are an especially
strong provider of transcendence. To provide more solid evidence that moral
standards are a stronger source of coherence and transcendence than conventional
standards, especially in the domain of transcendence, Study 2 aims to
experimentally manipulate construal level. If inducing concrete and abstract
construal activates a tendency to focus on coherence or transcendence
respectively, it should lead people to endorse conventional and moral standards as
providing more or less coherence or transcendence, depending on the level of
construal in which a person is operating.
Study 2 Overview
The Study 1 design allowed me to examine whether morality provides
more meaning across dimensions than convention, and whether this difference is
greater for transcendence than coherence. The goal of Study 2 was to expand on
the results of Study 1 and provide additional evidence that morality is indeed
more effective at providing coherence and transcendence than convention.
Furthermore, Study 2 tested the idea that states of concrete (compared to abstract)
construal increase the extent to which people feel a sense of coherence (but not
transcendence to the same degree), through morality compared to convention, and
that states of abstract (compared to concrete) construal lead people to experience
more transcendence (but not coherence to the same degree) through morality
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compared to convention. According to construal level theory, people in states of
concrete construal focus on the specifics of a situation whereas people in abstract
construal focus on the larger picture (Trope & Liberman, 2010). In other words,
one might think of concrete construal as looking at the trees and abstract construal
as looking at the forest (Fujita, 2008). To induce either concrete or abstract
construal the NAVON task requires participants to quickly examine a compound
letter made of smaller letters. For example, a participant might be presented with
a compound A that is formed with a large amount of small Bs. To induce concrete
construal, participants would be asked to identify whether or not a series of
compound letters were formed with a specific small letter (e.g., a B). To induce
abstract construal, participants would be asked to identity whether the compound
letter is a specific letter (e.g., an A).
By inducing states of concrete and abstract construal and observing the
extent to which people endorse moral over conventional standards differentially
across levels of construal, Study 2 provided a more thorough test of the idea that
coherence operates in states of concrete construal and transcendence operates in
states of abstract construal. Study 2 also provides a more thorough test of the idea
that people endorse moral standards as providing the dimension of meaning that is
most accessible to participants. This provides an experimental test that coherence
and transcendence are indeed experienced, at and are most clearly associated with,
concrete and abstract construal, respectively. It also provides a test of the idea that
that moral standards are especially effective at creating each dimension of
meaning in its associated state of construal compared to conventional standards.
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Study 2 Hypotheses
Study 2 was based on three primary hypotheses, the expected patterns
reflected by these hypotheses are depicted in Figure 2.

Hypothesis I. There should be a main effect of type of standard such that
participants will endorse moral standards as providing more coherence and
transcendence than conventional standards overall.

Hypothesis II. There should be a two-way interaction between dimension
of meaning and construal level, such that inducing states of concrete
construal will lead participants to endorse standards as providing more
coherence, and inducing abstract construal will lead participants to
endorse standards as creating more transcendence.

Hypothesis III. To the extent that morality is more effective than
convention at providing meaning, the two way-interaction described above
should be stronger when participants endorse the meaning provided by
moral standards than by endorsing the meaning provided by convention.
That is, type of standard will qualify the above-mentioned two-way
interaction. In states of concrete construal, people will endorse moral
standards as creating slightly more transcendence than conventional
standards, but will endorse moral standards as providing much more
coherence than is created by conventional standards (see left side of
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Figure 2). However, in states of abstract construal, morality will be
endorsed as creating slightly more coherence than is created by convention,
but abstract construal will lead people to endorse morality as creating
much more transcendence than is created by convention (see right side of
Figure 2).
Study 2 Method

Participants
Participants were 113 people (Nmen = 38) and (Nwomen = 75) enrolled in
undergraduate level introductory psychology courses at DePaul University. The
study used a 2 (Construal Level: Concrete vs. Abstract) X 2 (Type of Standard:
Conventional vs. Moral) X 2(Dimension of Meaning: Coherence vs.
Transcendence) mixed design, with Dimension of Meaning as a within subjects
factor. To determine the number of subjects to be used in the experiment, I used
G*Power version 3.1 specifying an F test for a mixed-ANOVA with one 2-level,
within-subjects factor, and four between subject measurement groups. I specified
a small effect size when computing the power analysis (ηp2 = .04; Cohen, 1988),
and used a 1-β error probability of .8 as is convention in power analyses (Mazen,
Hemmasi, & Lewis 1985). To my knowledge no literature has examine the effect
of a NAVON task on the experience of meaning, and I want to be sure to have
adequate power to detect effects that are present. The results of the power analysis
suggested 80 participants.
Participants completed an experimental manipulation in person in a
psychology lab, and then completed several survey tasks. The manipulation was
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designed to place participants in a condition that induces either a state of concrete
or abstract construal. Participants received partial fulfillment of their psychology
research participation course credit in return for completing the study. All
participants 18 years of age and above were eligible to participate in the study.
Procedure and Materials
After entering the lab and providing consent, participants completed a
construal manipulation (the NAVON task; Navon, 1977) to induce states of
abstract or concrete construal.
After the NAVON manipulation, participants completed the measures of
meaning provided by moral and conventional standards used in Study 1. If it is
the case that construal level facilitates coherence and transcendence differentially,
the NAVON manipulation of concrete construal should increase the extent to
which people endorse morality and conventionality as sources of coherence and
transcendence.
Construal level manipulation. Participants first completed an
experimental manipulation, the NAVON task (Navon, 1977) to induce a state of
concrete or abstract construal. In a NAVON task, participants were shown large
letters that are made up of smaller letters (i.e., a series of compound letters; see
Appendix J). These compound letters were presented to participants on a
computer screen one at a time, and participants were asked to press a key to
indicate whether or not there was a specific large compound letter on the screen
(e.g., an E, as depicted on the left side of Appendix J) or if the small letters
making up that letter were a specific letter (e.g., an E, as depicted on the right side
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of Appendix J). Participants completed all trials looking for either the presence of
a large compound letter (an induction of abstract construal), or a small letter
making up a compound letter (an induction of concrete construal). This variable
constitutes a between subjects manipulation.
Conventional and moral standards create coherence and
transcendence measures. Following the construal level manipulation,
participants completed one of the same two measures of the extent to which moral
or conventional standards create coherence and transcendence used in Study 1 on
the same response scales used in Study 1 (See Appendices A, B, and C). In Study
2, participants did not write about their moral or conventional standards, but
moved immediately to responding to the items assessing the extent to which
moral or conventional standards provide coherence or transcendence to prevent
the manipulation from wearing off before participants had a chance to respond to
these items. The instructions for Study 2 are labeled as such in the Appendixes.
Demographics. Finally, participants responded to a series of demographic
measures, such as age, sex, political orientation, income, and religious orientation
(see Appendix I).
Study 2 Results
Pilot Test
As in Study 1, I first tested whether or not participants differentiated
between their moral and conventional beliefs in terms of their ratings of
objectivity and universality while describing them in writing. Participants wrote
about their moral or conventional standards to provide an idea of the kinds of
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things that came to their minds when responding to the prompt. I examined
whether or not people who wrote about morals rated them as more objective than
conventions. Again, the results presented in Table 3 show that participants
consistently rated their morals as more objective, universal, and emotionally
charged than their conventions.
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Table 3: Results from Study 2 Pretest
t

Mmoral

SD

Mconvention

SD

I think that other people should follow the [conventions/morals] I just wrote
about in all situations.
The [conventions/morals] I just wrote about are no more important than any
of my other beliefs.
The [conventions/morals] I just wrote about are sacred to me.
Even if it were against the law, I would follow the [conventions/morals] I just
wrote about.
The [conventions/morals] I just wrote about represent what I think is
absolutely right or wrong.
There is nothing special about the [conventions/morals] I just wrote about.

3.07**

4.64

1.68

3.00

1.82

2.80**

3.59

1.47

4.76

1.26

1.06
2.92**

4.45
4.95

2.04
1.68

3.81
3.33

1.97
1.96

1.49

4.91

1.85

4.05

1.94

1.57

2.00

.93

2.62

1.60

I would be willing to change the [conventions/morals] that I just wrote about
if I was in a situation in which other people wanted me to.

3.47**
*

2.41

1.71

4.14

1.56

When people violate the [conventions/morals] I just wrote about I do not
usually get angry with them.
I feel that the [conventions/morals] I just wrote about are sacred.

2.13*

3.86

1.36

2.81

1.86

1.91+

4.41

1.74

3.38

1.80

I would change the [conventions/morals] I just wrote about if I were in
another country where people have different beliefs.

5.24**
*

2.55

1.57

5.05

1.56

Note: Participants in Study 2 rated either their conventional or moral standards. The wording of each item either asked
about conventional or moral standards. +p<.10, *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001
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To test Hypothesis I-III, I ran a 2 (Construal Level: Concrete vs. Abstract)
X 2 (Type of Standard: Conventional vs. Moral) X 2 (Dimension of Meaning:
Coherence vs. Transcendence) mixed ANOVA, with Dimension of Meaning as a
within subjects factor.
Hypothesis I
To examine the idea that moral standards may create more meaning than
conventional standards, I examined the main effect of type of standard. No main
effect emerged, and Hypothesis I was not supported F(1,109) = .53, p = .47, ηp2
= .004 (see Figure 4 for the results of Hypothesis I, II, and III).
Hypothesis II
To test whether or not inducing concrete construal provides more
coherence than transcendence, and inducing states of abstract construal provide
more transcendence than coherence, I examined the interaction between
dimension of meaning and construal level. No interaction emerged F(1, 109)
= .03, p = .87, ηp2 <.001, and Hypothesis II was not supported.
Hypothesis III
To examine whether or any interaction between dimension of meaning and
construal level was moderated by type of standard, I examined the three-way
interaction between dimension of meaning, construal level, and type of standard.
No three-way interaction was present F(1, 109) = 2.20 , p =.14, ηp2 = .02. Thus,
there was no support for Hypothesis III.

	
  

Figure 5: Results from Study 2.
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Study 2 Discussion
There was no support for any of the Study 2 hypotheses. With regards to
Hypothesis I, there was one major difference in the manipulation of type of
standard that may have contributed to the lack of a main effect for type of
standard: Participants did not write about their moral or conventional standards. In
Study 1, participants were required to reflect and write about these standards,
which most likely created a more powerful reminder of what participants’ moral
and conventional standards are. In addition, in writing about their moral and
conventional standards, participants in Study 1 were most likely able to make
concrete connections between the way their moral standards make them feel in
terms of coherence and transcendence. The prompt in Study 2 may have served as
a reminder of participants’ moral and conventional standards, but may have only
resulted in vague, nebulous, or weak recollections of these standards for
participants. In addition, without the structure of a writing prompt, participants
may have responded to the prompts while thinking about both morals and
conventions, which may have lead them rate both conventional and moral
standards as creating relatively high levels of coherence and transcendence. A
lack of a focus on specific moral and conventional standards could explain the
lack of the predicted main effect of moral standards. Participants simply may not
have reflected on their standards clearly enough to make strong differentiations
between them.
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The lack of an interaction between type of standard and construal level as

posited in Hypothesis 2 may have been because of the nature of the construal
manipulation used in Study 2. The NAVON task is a visual task, and such a task
may not have strong associations with participants’ conceptual and emotional
sense of concrete and abstract standards as they relate to meaning.
Finally, the lack of a three way-interaction between dimension of meaning,
construal level, and type of standard may have been caused by a combination of
the factors that may underlie the lack of support for Hypotheses I and II. If it is
truly the case that the type of standard manipulation did not lead participants to
think clearly about their moral and conventional standards, and the NAVON task
did not affect construal level in the predicted fashion, then it would be unlikely
that any interaction would be present between these factors.
In the future, it may be helpful to do two things to increase the power of
the study manipulation and increase the effectiveness of the construal
manipulation. First, it may be helpful to ask participants to actually write about
the conventional and moral standards they thought about in Study 2. Second, it
may be helpful to devise a more powerful and also direct manipulation of
construal level.
There are probably numerous ways in which this could be done. In terms
of the standards manipulation, participants could simply be asked to write about
their standards. In terms of the construal manipulations, participants could be
asked to describe the ways in which safety and predictability in the immediate
environment are important to them. This could be embedded in the type of
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standards manipulation writing activity itself. Alternatively, a measure such as the
BIF could be used as an individual difference variable at the beginning of the
study as a proxy for a construal manipulation. I would expect that participants in
low levels of chronic construal would find much more coherence in their moral
standards compared to their conventional standards compared to transcendence,
with only slightly more transcendence being experienced from morals compared
to conventions in this group. For participants operating in high levels of chronic
construal, I would expect them to report their moral standards as much greater
creators of transcendence compared to conventional standards, and to create
slightly more coherence than conventional standards.
Study 3 Overview
The purpose of Study 3 was to expand upon Studies 1 and 2 by
demonstrating that moral standards are not only endorsed as more effective in
providing meaning than conventional standards, but at compensating for threats to
coherence and transcendence. Study 3 also expanded on previous meaning theory
(e.g., Heine et al., 2006. By allowing me to examine whether or not people prefer
moral standards to conventional standards to compensate for threats to meaning.
An additional goal of Study 3 was to test the prediction that people are especially
likely to endorse morality after threats to transcendence compared to threats to
coherence.
Thus, in Study 3, I gave participants the opportunity to endorse the extent
to which they feel it is important to follow moral and conventional standards after
a threat to coherence, transcendence, or neutral feedback about coherence or
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transcendence. The meaning threat consists of a fake personality test made up of
the BIF, SOC, MLQ subscale, and NFC scales from Study 1 and feedback telling
participants their lives will either be devoid of coherence, devoid of transcendence,
or normal in terms of coherence or transcendence. Following the feedback,
participants rated how important it is to them to follow conventional and moral
standards. Using this methodology, I was able to specifically examine how people
respond to threats to dimensions of meaning by focusing on conventional or moral
standards. By allowing people to compensate for threats to meaning using moral
or conventional standards, I was able to test which type of standard (i.e.,
conventionality vs. morality) people prefer to use to compensate for threats to
different dimensions of meaning. This investigation builds on previous research
not only by examining the role of threats to dimensions of meaning in meaning
compensation, but by assessing whether moral standards are an especially
effective tool to compensate for lost meaning (particularly transcendence)
compared to conventional standards.
Study 3 Hypotheses
Study 3 was based on three primary hypotheses, the expected patterns
reflected by these hypotheses are depicted in Figure 3.

Hypothesis I. I predict a main effect, such that people will endorse the
importance of moral standards more than conventional standards in
general.
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Hypothesis II. I predict a two-way interaction between type of standard
and threat condition. People should endorse the importance of moral
standards compared to conventional standards to a greater extent after
threats to meaning compared to no threats.

Hypothesis III. I expect, the abovementioned two-way interaction to be
qualified by dimension of threat. When coherence is threatened, people
will endorse moral standards as more important than conventional
standards, and when transcendence is threatened, this pattern will be
especially pronounced. Under neutral feedback regarding both types of
standards, moral standards should be rated as slightly more important than
conventional standards. These hypotheses are represented in Figure 3.

Study 3 Method
Participants and Design
Participants were 128 undergraduates from DePaul University’s
undergraduate psychology subject pool (Men = 50; Women = 78). The study used
a 2 (Threat Condition: Threatened vs. Not Threatened) X 2 (Dimension of
Meaning: Coherence vs. Transcendence) X 2 (Type of Standard: Conventional vs.
Moral) mixed ANOVA, with the third factor as a within subjects factor. To
determine the number of subjects, I used G*Power version 3.1 specifying an F
test for a mixed-ANOVA with one 2 level within-subjects factor and four between
subject measurement groups. I specified a small effect size to be conservative
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when computing the power analysis as the measures have not been tested in
previous literature (ηp2 = .04; Cohen, 1988), and used a 1-β error probability of .8
as is convention in power analyses (Mazen, Hemmasi, Lewis 1985). This analysis
yielded the same recommended 80 participants as in Study 2.
Participants completed an experimental manipulation in a laboratory
setting and then responded to survey measures assessing the extent to which they
endorse morality and conventionality as providing coherence and transcendence.
Participants received partial fulfillment of their psychology research participation
course credit in return for completing the study. All participants were 18 years of
age and above.
Procedure and Materials
Participants entered the lab, completed informed consent, and then
completed an experimental manipulation. The manipulation involved telling
participants that they will be lacking in aspects of life representing coherence or
transcendence, or that they will be relatively normal in these dimensions. This
manipulation allowed me to examine the extent to which people endorse moral
and conventional standards in response to threats to the coherence and
transcendent dimensions of meaning, as well as neutral feedback. After the
manipulation, participants completed a manipulation check to assess whether or
not they had accurately remembered the feedback they were given.
Meaning threat manipulation. Participants first completed an
experimental manipulation designed to threaten either coherence or transcendence.
As part of the experimental manipulation, all participants, regardless of which
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condition they were in, were told that they were going to take a test used by
credible institutions that strongly predicts a variety of life outcomes, and that we
would be examining how scores on this measure are related to social behavior. In
one condition (i.e., the coherence threat condition) participants were told that we
were specifically interested in examining the probability that people’s lives will
be secure, predictable, and organized. In the other, the transcendence threat
condition, participants were told that we were specifically interested in examining
the likelihood that a person’s life will be fulfilling, purposeful, engaging. The first
part of this manipulation (i.e., the prompts participants read before they took the
fake personality test), and can be found in Appendix K.
Following the initial prompt, participants responded to the “GAP”
inventory, which was actually composed of a set of the same scales used to test,
discriminant, and criterion validity from Study 1 (i.e., the Behavior Identification
Form, the short Need for Closure Scale, The SOC, and the MLQ). These items
gave the appearance of a personality test.
After completing the faux personality inventory, participants received the
faux results of their inventory. Participants received either threatening or neutral
feedback corresponding to coherence (if they read the coherence prompt) or
transcendence (if they read the transcendence prompt). In the coherence threat
condition, participants received feedback showing that they would most likely
live a life low in security, predictability, and organization (see Appendix L). In
the transcendence threat condition, participants received feedback showing that
they would most likely live a life low in engagement, purpose, and fulfillment
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(see Appendix L). In the neutral coherence condition, participants received
information that they would be relatively normal compared to the rest of the
population in terms of these attributes (see Appendix L).
Manipulation check. Participants completed a manipulation check after
the threat manipulation to assess whether or not they paid attention to the
manipulation, and whether or not the manipulation did in fact threaten coherence
(in the coherence threat condition) or transcendence (in the transcendence threat
condition) compared to the neutral conditions (see Appendix M). Participants
responded to scales asking how likely they were told it is they will live a coherent
or transcendent life, and questions about how likely it is these things will actually
happen.
Importance of moral and conventional standards. Following the threat
manipulation, participants rated the importance of morality vs. conventionality
(See Appendix N). These measures were based on previous research on moral
centrality and motivation (Krettenauer, 2011) and moral chronicity (which
assesses traits often associated with morality; Narvaez, Lapsley, Hagele, & Lasky,
2005), and are adapted in the spirit of assessing the extent to which moral vs.
conventional standards were important to participants.
Search for meaning. At the end of the study, directly before the
demographics, participants responded to the search for meaning scale for
exploratory purposes. This scale is a subscale of the MLQ that examines
participants’ desire to find meaning in life ( see Appendix O; Steger et al., 2006).
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Behavioral measure of desire for coherence and transcendence.

Participants completed a behavioral measure after the threat manipulation to
assess whether or not the manipulation did in fact threaten coherence (in the
coherence threat condition) or transcendence (in the transcendence threat
condition) compared to the neutral conditions. The behavioral measure told
participants that they would complete a training module of their choice at the end
of the study. They were given the option to choose between a training module
about how to live a coherent life, or a module about how to lead a transcendent
life (see Appendix P). Participants should prefer the coherence module compared
to the transcendence module after the coherence threat compared to all other
conditions, and prefer the transcendence module compared to the coherence
module compared to all other conditions.
Demographics. Finally, participants responded to a series of demographic
measures, such as age, sex, political orientation, income, and religious orientation
and religious strength (see Appendix I).
Study 3 Results
Manipulation Check
I began the Study 3 analyses by examining which participants had
adequately understood and remembered the percentages they were assigned in the
experimental feedback conditions. In the threat condition, I removed any
participants that rated themselves at or above the 50% mark on any of the
indicators of coherence or transcendence. In the control condition, I removed any
participants rating themselves below the 50% mark on any of the indicators of
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coherence or transcendence. This resulted in the removal of 9 participants, leaving
the final N of 128.
Hypothesis I
To test Hypothesis I, I ran a 2 (Threat Condition: Threatened vs. Not
Threatened) X 2 (Dimension of Meaning: Coherence vs. Transcendence) X 2
(Type of Standard: Conventional vs. Moral) mixed ANOVA, with the third factor
as a within subjects factor. Consistent with Hypothesis I, there was a main effect
of type of standard, such that participants endorsed moral standards to a greater
extent than conventional standards F(1, 124) = 235.84, p < .001, ηp2 = .66 (see
Figure 7). No other effects emerged (all ps > .35).
Hypothesis II
To examine Hypothesis II, I examined the two-way interaction between
type of standard and threat condition. Contrary to Hypothesis II, there was no
interaction between type of standard and threat condition F(1, 124) = .18, p = .67,
ηp2 = .001.
Hypothesis III
To examine Hypothesis III, I examined the three-way interaction between
type of standard, threat condition, and dimension of meaning. Contrary to
Hypothesis III, no interaction was present F(1, 124) = .96, p = .96, ηp2 < .001.

	
  

	
  

Figure 6: Results from Study 3
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Behavioral Measure
To examine the behavioral measure, I coded participants’ choices to
complete a module coaching life “organization and planning” as 0, and a module
about how to live with “purpose and meaning” as 1. I then regressed this measure
on the threat condition and type of standard variables (see Figure 8). Counter to
expectations, a main effect of threat condition, χ2(1) = 3.72, p = .05,
demonstrated that participants were more likely to prefer the module about
purpose in the threat condition than in the control condition, but no other effects
emerged.
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0
Threat
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Figure 7: Results of Study 3 behavioral analysis.
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Study 3 Discussion
There was very little support for the Study 3 hypotheses. The only

hypothesis to receive any support was Hypothesis I, demonstrating that people
endorsed their moral standards more than their conventional standards. This
finding is in line with previous work demonstrating that morals are experienced
more strongly than conventions, as well as with a sense of objectivity and
universality. This finding is also in line with my theoretical perspective that moral
standards provide a greater sense of meaning than conventional standards (the
moral primacy hypothesis). To the extent that morals are experienced more
strongly and provide more coherence and transcendence than conventional
standards, people should endorse their importance more strongly than conventions.
There may be a reason reasons for the lack of support for Hypothesis II.
Although participants did have a good recollection of the results of the GAP, I do
not have a measure explicitly addressing how threatening their feedback was to
them. It may be the case that participants believed the results of their inventory,
but did not feel particularly threatened by them. Furthermore, the lack of an
interaction for the behavioral measure suggests that people were not in the
mindset to seek coherence and transcendence in the predicted fashion based on
the manipulation. Participants under threat were more likely to want to learn
about how to find purpose compared to security, but the type of meaning sought
after did not change based on type of threat.
The Study 3 Results may also be explained by self-affirmation. To the
extent that the measures of moral and conventional importance served as a way
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for participants to affirm their sense of meaning and worth following threats, they
may have wiped out the effect of the threat manipulation. An examination of the
scale might suggest that some items allowed participants to affirm their moral
characteristics (e.g. trustworthiness). Research on self-affirmation (Sherman et al.,
2013) suggests that self-affirmation may decrease the impact of threatening
constructs like stereotypes, and it may be the case that this applies to meaning
threats as well. If this is true, the lack of results in Study 3 may be due at least in
part to self-affirmation.
Although unexpected, this pattern of results may also not be particularly
surprising based on the asymmetry hypothesis. When participants are threatened
with a lack of coherence or transcendence, they might seek transcendence to
alleviate either type of threat. In addition, participants in the control condition did
not receive a particularly optimistic assessment from the results of their test
regarding their likelihood of achieving coherence or transcendence. The highest
probability of finding meaning through predictability or purpose was below the 75
percent mark for all aspects of meaning in the control condition, and in one case
(predictability and fulfillment) it was closer to 50 percent. Hence, participants
may have felt slightly threatened in the control condition. It may be useful in
future studies to give feedback that is more positive in the control condition, as all
participants may have been equally threatened in both conditions. It would also be
useful to add a manipulation check to assess how threatened participants were by
the feedback.
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With regards to Hypothesis III, a potential reason for the lack of results

could be that people simply do not look to their moral or conventional standards
(or at least alter them), when they are threatened with incoherence or a lack of
transcendence. People may have a static level with which they experience their
moral and conventional standards as important, and they may not increase the
importance of these standards following threats. However, this does not mean that
people do not focus more on conventions or morals to a greater extent for more
specific purposes (i.e. creating coherence and transcendence after threat). If I had
asked participants to rate the extent to which they think their conventional and
moral standards are important for creating predictability and providing purpose,
more nuanced patterns may have emerged.
Despite the lack of overall support for the Study 3 hypotheses, the results
of Study 3 still shed additional light on the idea that people experience their moral
standards as more important than their conventional standards. This information
provides a conceptual replication for the results of Study 1 in support of the moral
primacy hypothesis, and suggests that moral standards are a powerful part of
peoples’ lives.
General Discussion
The overall purpose of the work presented here was to examine the idea that
moral standards are more effective at creating meaning, especially in the form of
transcendence, than conventional standards. Overall there are several take home
messages and suggestions for future research that can be culled from the present
investigation. First, there is evidence across all three studies providing a
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conceptual replication of the moral conviction literature demonstrating that moral
standards are experienced with a greater sense of objectivity and universality than
conventional standards. This evidence also provides support for the moral
primacy hypothesis. In addition, the current investigation is one of the first to
explicitly measure the feelings of objectivity and universality accompanying both
moral and conventional standards. This new conceptual replication of the extant
literature helps to both provide replication and clarity to research and theory
suggesting moral standards are experienced with a greater sense of objectivity and
universality than social conventions. Second, the present research provides initial
evidence that people experience meaning across the dimensions of coherence and
transcendence, and that moral and conventional standards are imbued with
different levels of these dimensions of meaning (see Study 1 interaction). These
findings add additional depth to both the literature on the structure of feelings of
meaningfulness, as well as the small but growing literature on the relationship
between morality and meaning. Third, the failure of the current investigation to
effectively manipulate the extent to which types of standards provide coherence
and transcendence may provide hints about how to design a better future test of
the relationship between construal level and meaning, as well as types of
standards. Fourth, the failure of the present investigation to alter the coherence
and transcendence provided by moral and conventional standards may provide
additional insight into which types of threat manipulations are more or less
effective in altering the meaning provided by types of standards. These issues are
described in detail in the subsections below.
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Conceptual Replication of Previous Findings
The results of the current investigation provide a strong conceptual
replication across studies of the extant literature suggesting that moral standards
are experienced as more objective and universal than other types of standards.
This evidence is borne out in both the Study 1 and 2 pilot tests, and in the overall
results of Study 3, which demonstrate that people rate the moral standards are
more objective, universal, and emotionally laden than their conventional
standards. Previous theory and research suggest that people experience their
morals more powerfully than other types of standards, but this literature rarely (if
ever) included explicit tests of the objectivity and universality of conventional and
moral standards. The present investigation provides additional credence and
empirical tests to the back up the idea that moral standards are experienced as
more objective and universal than conventional standards.
In addition to providing credence to, and replication of, past literature, the
present studies measure moral and conventional standards using conceptuallysimilar, but non-overlapping items to measure moral standards. Previous literature
has examined moral conviction concerning a variety of issues. The current study
examined moral standards using a wide set of items, but allowed participants to
choose the issues they feel are most relevant to their moral and conventional
standards in the writing prompts. In combination, these factors allow the present
research to examine the objectivity and universality associated with moral and
conventional standards using a wide range of items and a less restricted focus on
specific issues.
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Insight Into the Structure of Meaning
The current investigation also provides potential insight into the nature
and structure of meaning. The correlations between the scales of coherence and
transcendence provided by conventional and moral standards with the convergent
and discriminant validity scales did not generally match the study hypotheses. The
correlations between need for order and structure, open-mindedness, discomfort
with ambiguity, and preference for predictability with coherence and
transcendence were equal. However the correlations do seem to demonstrate a
general tendency for the BIF, the SOC transcendence items, and the MLQ, to
relate at least slightly more powerfully to transcendence than to coherence. This
may provide partial support for the hypothesis that the transcendence items should
relate more strongly than the convention items to measures tapping into a sense of
purpose. This provides convergent validity for the transcendence items. That
being said, the remainder of the scales, proposed to tap more into coherence than
transcendence, appears to correlate equally with the coherence scale. Although
this was not predicted, there may be a reason for it based in the current theoretical
perspective. I propose that achieving a sense of coherence may not increase
feelings of transcendence as strongly as feelings of transcendence may also feed
into a sense of coherence. To the extent that this is true, it might be expected that
people who experience their conventional and moral standards as providing
transcendence may also have or seek greater levels of coherence.
The results of the current investigation did not provide particularly strong
evidence for the existence of two distinct dimension of meaning, but more work
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should be done to further examine the potential existence of dimensions of
meaning. The importance of both coherence and transcendence seems intuitive to
many. Philosophical examinations of meaning even contain aspects of meaning
that map onto the dimensions of coherence and transcendence (Glover, 2012);
therefore, it is premature to dismiss the multidimensionality of meaning based on
a limited number of findings.
Conversely, it is also possible that the results presented here are not in fact
a methodological artifact, and that meaning does not consist of two dimensions.
The correlations between the coherence and transcendence scales were extremely
high, suggesting that there may be no true demarcation between dimensions of
meaning. It could be the case that people feel their lives have a greater purpose
when their lives are orderly, that their lives are orderly when they have purpose,
or there may be a reciprocal relationship between feelings of order and purpose.
However, it may also be the case that meaning is a one-dimensional construct,
which would preclude any relationship between the non-existing dimensions of
coherence and transcendence. If this is the case it would have strong implications
for the extant theoretical perspective. For example, if meaning consists of only
one dimension, it may be the case the moral standards simply provide more
meaning than conventional standards, but not in the nuanced way proposed here.
Meaning and its Relationship to Types of Standards
Across two out of the three present studies, there was support for the
hypothesis that moral standards provide a greater sense of meaning, including
both coherence and transcendence, than conventional standards. This finding
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provides an important bridge between the morality and meaning literatures, and
builds upon each theoretically. The finding that moral standards, which are
experienced as more objective and universal than conventional standards and are
experienced as providing more meaning overall provides initial support for the
idea that the characteristics of morals provide powerful meaning. Not only do
these results suggest that morals create meaning broadly, but they suggest that
moral standards are the most powerful predictor of the dimension of meaning,
transcendence, which is expected to provide a broad and universal sense of
purpose. These patterns are borne out in the Study 1 interaction. These results are
supportive of the study hypotheses suggesting that the objective and universal
properties of moral standards contribute to feelings of transcendence. To provide
a more explicit examination of these ideas, future studies could assess whether or
not the interaction found in Study 1 can be explained by the objective and
universal properties of moral standards by including measures explicitly asking
participants about these moral characteristics.
In addition, it may be the case that the delineation between moral and
conventional standards is not absolute in reality or in the present study. An
examination of Table 1 for example demonstrates that there were not ceiling
effects for the objectivity and universality of the moral standards participants
described, and participants did attribute some degree of objectivity and
universality to their conventional standards. This suggests that morals and
conventions may operate on a continuum, with extreme moral standards as
absolutely objective and universal, and conventional standards seen as completely
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subjective and situational. In addition it could also be the case that as
conventional standards are seen as more objective and universal over time (say if
the strength of one’s beliefs increases) that conventions may become moral
standards. Hence, the present results may be seen as representing the differences
in meaning provided by standards, as they are experienced as more or less moral.
It may also be the case that moral standards are created when conventional
standards are imbued with meaning. For example if a person experiences the task
of guests taking their shoes off at the door as completely non-indicative of the
guests’ level of respect for the person’s house, they may not experience it as a
meaningful act, and not become angry if guests forget to take off their shoes.
However, if the person begins to derive a sense of meaning and respect from the
act of removing shoes, it may become moralized. More work is still yet to be done
to determine the antecedents of moral and conventional standards.
Manipulating and Measuring Moral Standards
The present studies may also provide useful information to take into
account in future investigation including the manipulation and measurement of
moral and conventional standards. A comparison of the results of Studies 1 and 2
suggests it may be more useful to provide participants with the ability to focus on
specific moral issues when responding to questions about their moral standards.
The stark contrast between the ratings of coherence and transcendence provided
by moral and conventional standards between Studies 1 and 2 suggests that
participants may not have had a clear idea in mind of how their morals and
conventions provided meaning in Study 2. This very well may have been a result
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of the fact that participants in Study 1 wrote explicitly about their moral or
conventional standards, whereas participants in Study 2 did not. Previous work on
moral conviction (e.g. Skitka et al., 2005) has required participants to respond to
measures of moral conviction and attitude strength that pertain to specific policies.
When looking at this literature and the results of Study 1 in the present work, it
appears that only asking participants to consider their morals and conventions
when responding to prompts may be too nebulous, as the results of Study 2 do not
replicate the patterns from Study 1, or conceptually replicate previous literature.
Similarly, future studies examining the relation of construal level to
dimensions of meaning and types of standards may need to use a more targeted
construal level manipulation. Such a manipulation might include asking
participants to focus specifically on the way that their moral and conventional
standards enable them to either accomplish basic daily tasks, such as predicting
the environment and feelings good about things they are immediately involved in,
or providing a broader sense of structure and purpose over the long term. Such a
manipulation may create a more tangible connection between the level of
construal in which a person is operating, and the sense of coherence and
transcendence provided by their moral and conventional standards. If it is difficult
to devise a manipulation to this effect, it may also suffice to use individual
difference measures, such as the BIF, as independent variables that could be used
to test a moderating role of trait construal level on the sense of coherence and
transcendence provided by standards.
Threatening Meaning and Focus on Moral Standards
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The results of Study 3 may provide insight into the manner in which future

research could threaten meaning with the goal of impacting levels of meaning
provided by moral and conventional standards. To the extent that specific feelings
towards policies, behaviors, ideologies, and other specific beliefs and values are
imbued with a sense of moral conviction, it may be more effective to threaten
specific attitudes or values when trying to impact how much meaning people
derive from their conventional and moral standards. Participants may not have
experienced any connection between the threat feedback they received and the
moral and conventional standards scales, a limitation that might be remedied by
altering the structure of the moral and conventional standards scales. Participants
could be given the same threat they received in Study 3, but the items assessing
moral and conventional standards could be re-worked to ask participants about
how much predictability and purpose their morals and conventions provide them.
It may even be best to use the measures of coherent and transcendent moral and
conventional standards from Studies 1 and 2 in place of the scales from Study 3.
Finally, it may be the case that it is simply very difficult, if not impossible
to change how much people focus on moral and conventional standards, and feel
that each is important, via meaning threats. This may be especially true of moral
standards, as they are experienced as objective and universal.
Further Examination of Asymmetrical Compensation
Another theoretical issue that would be worth examining in greater detail
in future studies is the assertion of the asymmetry hypothesis that it may be
difficult to compensate for threats to transcendence by reestablishing coherence.
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In Voltaire’s Candide, the protagonist expresses to Dr. Pangloss the idea that “we
must take care of our own garden” to render life livable. This observation was
made after realizing that a humble Turk had a more meaningful life from tending
his own small plot of land than those who have great wealth and are involved in
violence and deceit.
From this example one might infer that one might try to get one’s life in
order after their sense of transcendence is threatened, and that this may serve as a
springboard for the recreation of transcendence. There may be circumstances in
which this is the case. The integrated model of meaning suggests, as does the
meaning maintenance model, that people will choose the most direct route to
restore meaning. However, in some circumstances, a person might feel that their
life is devoid of transcendence, and attempt to shore up order in their environment
to serve as scaffolding that can be used to create new systems of transcendence. If
one loses a loved one for example, they may throw themselves into a job while
they process their loss and eventually recreate feelings of transcendence. There
may be fewer instances in which this occurs than when threats to coherence are
compensated for by seeking transcendence, as some losses of transcendence may
be too great to overcome with an immediate sense of consistency.
Conclusions
The results of the current investigation contain many useful insights into
the nature and structure of both feelings of meaningfulness, and moral and
conventional standards. These insights can help direct future research examining
the way that people experience meaning, and how moral and conventional
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standards provide a sense of meaning in life in a multitude of ways. Some
possible future directions of this work could be to replicate the results of Study 1
and further develop the measures of moral and conventional coherence and
transcendence to more closely map onto expected dimensions of coherence and
transcendence across standards. Future work should also develop better construal
and threat manipulations to assess the impact of construal and threat on types of
standards. This combination of steps has the potential to have an impact on the
literature examining both morals and meaning. Overall, the current investigation
suggests that moral standards are extremely important to people and provide them
with a sense of predictability and purpose in life. To the extent that people desire
a sense of meaning, it may be useful to them to focus on their moral standards.
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Appendix A
Conventional Standards Prompt

All people follow conventions in one form or another. Conventions are standard
practices that are commonly followed in a particular society. Conventions can
vary from place to place, and when a person experiences a standard as
conventional, they see it as applying differently from one society to another based
on the customs of the society in question and the social situation at hand.
For example, in some countries, people drive on the right side of the road, but in
others, they drive on the left side of the road. Some cultures eat with chopsticks
and others eat with forks and spoons, and in some countries it is customary to
consult family members when selecting a marriage partner, but in other countries
it is not. The people that engage in these acts often see them as conventional,
meaning that they follow them only because it is the norm to do so. As a result,
people do not see the standards of behavior described by their conventions as
absolutely right or wrong, and will often adjust their conventions when in
different situations. Despite this, people can get annoyed or offended when others
violate their conventional norms.
We would like you to please spend a few minutes to write a paragraph about some
of the conventions you frequently follow that fit the description of conventions
given in the first paragraph above. Please try to think of the conventions you
abide by on a daily basis and give an example of how they affect your behavior on
a day-to-day basis.
Example Responses From Participants:
•

•
•

•

•

I walk on the right side of the sidewalk and expect others to do so also. i become annoyed
if someone is walking towards me on the right side. also if two people are walking
towards me on the sidewalk, i expect the people to walk single file when they pass me. i
should not have to try to slide by the two of them walking towards me.
I use a fork when I'm eating anything with noodles. I drive on the right side of the road. I
go to church on Sundays in my local neighborhood. I watch sports on Sundays as well. I
throw out the trash on Mondays.
I greet people at work each day though I really do not want to. It would be rude to not
greet them. I thank co-workers for helping me even though they get paid to do so. When
it is someone's birthday I tell them happy birthday.
I typically wear a shirt and jeans when I go out to run errands. Other people in other
cultures might wear dresses, or very modest clothing or some other type of clothing. My
clothing affects my behavior in that it's comfortable, I'm used to it, and it's casual.
A conventional set of rules that I abide with is sending my children to public school. I
use to homeschool, which is not the norm for my area. Now I get them up at a certain
time and have them ready for the school bus by a certain time. When they get home I
have them do their homework and review any notes from their teacher.
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Appendix B
Moral Standards Prompt

All people follow morals in one form or another. Morals are beliefs and standards
that a person sees as representing what is absolutely right or wrong. This means
that morals are experienced as representing what is absolutely right or wrong in
all societies and situations regardless of the laws or customs of a given place.
For example, some people feel that everyone has the right to move from one
economic class to another through hard work, and would think it unjust to deny
opportunities for success based on arbitrary things like gender or skin color. Some
people adhere to specific diets because they think eating certain foods (e.g., pork)
is immoral, and others feel morally invested in political issues like gun control or
same-sex marriage. Because morals are seen as absolutely right or wrong
regardless of the context, people are deeply invested in their morals, and feel
angry at, and disgusted by, people who violate their morals.
We would like you to please spend a few minutes to write a paragraph about some
of your own morals that fit the description of morals given in the first paragraph
above. Please try to think of the morals you abide by on a daily basis and give an
example of how they affect your behavior on a day-to-day basis.
Example Responses From Participants:
•

•

•

•

•

Day to day I try to be as honest and free about how I think and the things that I do. So no
matter how controversial, I always speak my opinion on the matter. I like to think that I
have independent opinions and I don't go along with the crowd.
I believe that morally wrong things consist of things that intensionally harm another
person emotionally or physically. All people should have the same opportunities; whether
this be the right to marry whoever they want or the same job opportunity everyone should
be given the same right. If these rights that do not harm anyone else are prohibited it is
morally wrong.
A few of the morals with which I conduct my life include the "haves" helping the "have
nots", humane treatment of animals, people working together for the good of the larger
group rather than just themselves and our responsibility to protect and nurture our
environment.
I believe in man and woman getting married and having a family. I believe that it is
inmoral to have same sex marriage. That is my opinion, I do not talk to homosexuals, but
it is my moral belief. I try to treat everyone the same.
People have a right to self-determination, to living a life free of violence, to adequate
food. Not stealing, being honest about my work hours. BDS movement.
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Appendix C
Moral and Conventional Coherence and Transcendence Scale

Study 1 Conventional Standards Scale Directions: Please respond to the
following statements about the CONVENTIONS you just wrote about using the
scales provided.
In general, the CONVENTIONS I follow in my daily life…
Study 1 Moral Standards Scale Directions: Please respond to the following
statements about the MORALS you just wrote about using the scales provided.
In general, the MORALS I follow in my daily life…
Study 2 Conventional Standards Scale Directions: Please respond to the
following statements about the CONVENTIONS you follow on a day-to-day
basis.
In general, the CONVENTIONS I follow in my daily life…
Study 2 Moral Standards Scale Directions: Please respond to the following
statements about the MORALS you follow on a day-to-day basis.
In general, the MORALS I follow in my daily life…
1

2

3

4

5

6

not at all
CC
CC
CC
CC
TC
TC
TC
TC
CB
CB

7
very much

Enable me to clearly determine why people
behave the way they do.
Enable me to deal with challenging
situations.
Enable me to avoid dangerous places.
Enable me to avoid unpredictable situations.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1
1

2
2

3
3

4
4

5
5

6
6

7
7

Make me to feel that my day to day routine
contributes to something greater than myself.
Enable me to understand the greater purpose
for doing the many small things that I do
everyday.
Enable me to make sense of many specific,
confusing situations.
Give life’s challenges a sense of ultimate
purpose.
Enable me to fit in to my social groups.
Help me function well in the groups I am a
part of.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1
1

2
2

3
3

4
4

5
5

6
6

7
7

	
  
CB
CB
TB
TB
TB
TB
CS
CS
CS
CS
TS
TS
TS
TS
CI
CI
CI
CI
TI
TI
TI
TI
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Enable me to respond appropriately to people
in my social groups.
Allow me to understand what people in my
social groups expect of me.
Enable me to feel that the groups I am a part
of really matter in the big picture.
Enable me to feel the groups I belong to have
a mission to fulfill
Enable me to make sense of the greater
reasons for the hardships my social groups
sometimes face
Create connections between members of my
social group that go beyond ordinary
friendship.
Enable me to feel like a consistent person.
Enable to me feel that I am a reliable person.
Help me figure out how I feel about my own
actions.
Enable me to know where I stand in society
compared to others.
Give me a great sense of personal purpose.
Make me feel like I really matter in the grand
scheme of things.
Make me feel that there is a special reason
behind my life.
Make me feel that my individual actions have
a reason bigger than I can understand.
Enable me to understand what happens when
I die.
Help me feel less frightened about dying.
Enable me to feel the process of death
follows a predictable structure.
Enable me to understand the process of
dying.
Help me feel that my good deeds in life with
live on after I die.
Make me to feel that my beliefs will carry on
through future generations.
Make me feel that I have made a difference.
Make me feel that I will be remembered after
I pass on.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1
1
1

2
2
2

3
3
3

4
4
4

5
5
5

6
6
6

7
7
7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1
1

2
2

3
3

4
4

5
5

6
6

7
7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1
1

2
2

3
3

4
4

5
5

6
6

7
7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1
1

2
2

3
3

4
4

5
5

6
6

7
7

Note: The first column contains a code, the first letter indicating which dimension
of meaning (coherence = C, transcendence = T), the second letter indicating
(which component of meaning the item captures (C = certainty, B = belonging, S
= self-esteem, I = symbolic immortality). This code will not be shown to
participants
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Appendix D
Manipulation Checks for Conventional and Moral Standards Prompts

Conventional Standards Scale Directions: Please respond to the following
questions about the conventions you just wrote about using the scales provided.
Moral Standards Scale Directions: Please respond to the following questions
about the morals you just wrote about using the scales provided.
1

2

3

4

totally disagree
I think that other people should follow
the morals/conventions I just wrote about
in all situations.
The morals/conventions I just wrote
about are no more important than any of
my other beliefs.
The morals/conventions I just wrote
about are sacred to me.
Even if it were against the law, I would
follow the morals/conventions I just
wrote about.
The morals/conventions I just wrote
about represent what I think is absolutely
right or wrong.
There is nothing special about the
morals/conventions I just wrote about
I would be willing to change the
morals/conventions that I just wrote
about if I was in a situation in which
other people wanted me to.
When people violate the
morals/conventions I just wrote about I
do not usually get angry with them.
When people violate the
morals/conventions I just wrote about I
am disgusted with them.
I feel that the morals/conventions I just
wrote about are sacred.
I would change the morals/conventions I
just wrote about if I were in another
country where people have different
beliefs

5

6

7
totally agree

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7
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Appendix E
Behavior Identification Form

Any behavior can be described in many ways. For example, one person
might describe a behavior as "writing a paper," while another person might
describe the same behavior as "pushing keys on the keyboard." Yet another
person might describe it as "expressing thoughts." This form focuses on your
personal preferences for how a number of different behaviors should be
described. Below you will find several behaviors listed. After each behavior will
be two different ways in which the behavior might be identified. For example:
1. Attending class
a. sitting in a chair
b. looking at a teacher
Your task is to choose the identification, a or b, that best describes the
behavior for you. Simply place a checkmark next to the option you prefer. Be
sure to respond to every item. Please mark only one alternative for each
pair. Remember, mark the description that you personally believe is more
appropriate for each pair.
Making a list
Reading
Joining the army
Washing clothes
Picking an apple
Chopping down a tree
Measuring a room for carpeting
Cleaning the house
Painting a room
Paying the rent
Caring for houseplants
Locking a door
Voting
Voting

a.
b.
a.
b.
a.
b.
a.
b.
a.
b.
a.
b.
a.
b.
a.
b.
a.
b.
a.
b.
a.
b.
a.
b.
a.
b.
a.
b.

Getting organized
Writing things down
Following lines of print
Gaining knowledge
Helping the nations defense
Signing up
Removing odors from clothes
Putting clothes into the machine
Getting something to eat
Pulling an apple of a branch
Wielding an axe
Getting firewood
Getting ready to remodel
Using a yard stick
Showing one’s cleanliness
Vacuuming the floor
Applying brush strokes
Making the room look fresh
Maintaining a place to live
Writing a check
Watering plants
Making the room look nice
Putting a key in the lock
Securing the house
Influencing the election
Marking a ballot
Influencing
the election
Marking a ballot

	
  
Climbing a tree
Filling out a personality test
Toothbrushing
Taking a test
Greeting someone
Resisting temptation
Eating
Growing a garden
Traveling by car
Having a cavity filled
Talking to a child
Pushing a doorbell
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a.
b.
c.
a.
b.
a.
b.
a.
b.
a.
b.
a.
b.
a.
b.
a.
b.
a.
b.
a.
b.
a.
b.
a.
b.

Getting a good view
B.holding onto brances
Holding on to branches
Answering questions
Revealing what you’re like
Preventing tooth decay
Moving a brush around in one’s
mouth
Answering questions
Showing one’s knowledge
Saying hello
Showing friendliness
Saying “no”
Showing moral courage
Getting nutrition
Chewing and swallowing
Planting seeds
Getting fresh vegetables
Following a map
Seeing countryside
Protecting your teeth
Going to the dentist
Teaching a child something
Using simple words
Moving a finger
Seeing if someone’s home
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Appendix F.
Shortened Need for Closure Scale

1
2
3
4
strongly disagree
1 I believe that orderliness and organization
are among the most important
characteristics of a good student.

5

6

7
strongly agree

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

4 When considering most conflict
situations, I can usually see how both sides
could be right.
2 I don't like to be with people who are
capable of unexpected actions.
2 I prefer to socialize with familiar friends
because I know what to expect from them.
1 I think that I would learn best in a class
that lacks clearly stated objectives and
requirements.
4 When thinking about a problem, I
consider as many different opinions on the
issue as possible.
3 I like to know what people are thinking all
the time.
3 I dislike it when a person's statement
could mean many different things.
3 It's annoying to listen to someone who
cannot seem to make up his or her mind.
1 I find that establishing a consistent routine
enables me to enjoy life more.
1 I enjoy having a clear and structured
mode of life.
4 I prefer interacting with people whose
opinions are very different from my own.
1 I like to have a place for everything and
everything in its place.
3 I feel uncomfortable when someone's

	
  
meaning or intention is unclear to me.
4 I always see many possible solutions to
problems I face.
3 I'd rather know bad news than stay in a
state of uncertainty.
4 I do not usually consult many different
opinions before forming my own view.
2 I dislike unpredictable situations.
1 I dislike the routine aspects of my work
(studies).
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1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1
1

2
2

3
3

4
4

5
5

6
6

7
7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Note: Column A indicates the facet scales: 1 = order, 2 = predictability, 3 =
ambiguity, 4 = open-mindedness.
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Appendix G
Sense of Coherence SOC

Here is a series of questions relating to various aspects of your life. Each question
has seven possible answers. Please mark the number, which expresses your
answer, with number 1 and 7 being the extreme answers. If the words under 1 are
right for you, circle 1: if the words under 7 are right for you, circle 7. If you feel
differently, circle the number which best expresses your feeling. Please give only
one answer to each question.
*Do you have feelings that you don’t
really care about what goes on around
you?
Has it happened in the past that you
were surprised by the behavior of
people whom you thought you knew
well?
Has it happened that people whom you
counted on disappointed you?
*Until now your life has had:

Do you have the feeling that you are
being treated unfairly?
Do you have the feeling that you are in
an unfamiliar situation and don’t know
what to do?
Doing the thing that you do every day
is:

1
2
very seldom
or never

3

4

5
6
7
very often

1
2
never
happened

3

4

5

1
2
never
happened
1
2
No clear
goals or
purpose at
all
1
2
very
often

3

4

5

6

3

4

7
always
happened
5
6
7
Very clear
goals and
purpose

3

4

5

6

1
very
often

3

4

1
2
3
a source
of deep pleasure
and satisfaction

4

6

2

6
7
always
happened

7
very
seldom
or never
5
6
7
very
seldom
or never
5
6
7
a source of
pain and
boredom

Do you have very mixed-up feelings
and ideas?

1
very
often

2

3

4

5

Does it happen that you have feelings
inside you that you would rather not
feel?

1
very
often

2

3

4

5

Many people – even those with a strong
character – sometimes feel like sad
sacks (losers) in certain situations. How
often have you felt this way in the past?

1
never

2

3

4

5

7
very
seldom
or never
6
7
very
seldom
or never
6
7
very
often

	
  
When something happened, have you
generally found that:

*How often do you have the feeling
that there’s little meaning in the things
you do in your daily life?
How often do you have feelings that
you’re not sure you can keep under
control?
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1
2
3
you
overestimated
or
underestimated
its
importance
1
2
3
very
often
1
very
often

2

3

4

5

4

5

4

5

6
7
you saw
things in
the right
proportion
6

7
very
seldom
or never
6
7
very
seldom
or never

Note: Items marked with an asterisk are expected to measure transcendence.
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Appendix H
Meaning in Life Questionnaire (MLQ)

Absolutely
Untrue
1

Mostly
Untrue
2

Somewhat
Can’t Say
Somewhat
Untrue
True or False
True
3
4
5

I understand my life’s meaning.
My life has a clear sense of
purpose.
I have a good sense of what
makes my life meaningful.
I have discovered a satisfying
life purpose.
My life has no clear purpose

Mostly
True
6

Absolutely
True
7

1
1

2
2

3
3

4
4

5
5

6
6

7
7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7
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Appendix I
Demographics

Please answer the following questions about yourself. Choose the best answer.
1. What is your sex? Male / Female / Other__________
2. What is your ethnicity?
<1> African-American/Black
<2> White/European American
<3> Middle Eastern/Middle Eastern American
<4> Asian/Asian-American
<5> Latino/a
<6> Multiracial/Other (please specify)__________________
3. Were you born in the United States?

Yes / No

4. Approximately, what is your FAMILY’s annual income?
<1> Under $20,000
<2> $20,000 to $39,999
<3> $40,000 to $59,999
<4> $60,000 to $79,999
<5> $80,000 to $99,999

<6> $100,000 to $119,999
<7> $120,000 to $139,999
<8> $140,000 to $159,999
<9> $160,000 to $179,999
<10> $180,000 and over

5. What is your age? ________ years old
6. When it comes to economic policy do you usually consider yourself a liberal, moderate, or
conservative?
1
strong
liberal

2
liberal

3
leaning
liberal

4
moderate

5
6
7
leaning
conservative strong
conservative
conservative

7. When it comes to social policy do you usually consider yourself a liberal, moderate or
conservative?
1
strong
liberal

2
liberal

3
leaning
liberal

4
moderate

5
6
7
leaning
conservative strong
conservative
conservative

8. What is your current class standing?
<1> Freshman
<2> Sophomore
<3> Junior

<4> Senior
<5> Graduate
<6> Other (please specify)__________________

9. When it comes to religion, do you consider yourself:
<1> Christian (e.g. Catholic, Orthodox, Protestant, non-denominational, etc.)
<2> Buddhist
<3> Muslim
<4> Hindu
<5> Jewish
<6> Atheist
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Appendix J
NAVON
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Appendix K
Threat Prompts

Coherence Threat Prompt
The current study assesses personality traits that have been shown to relate
to the type of life a person will have, and how these traits relate to social behavior.
What follows is a commonly used psychological inventory called the Goal
Achievement Probability Inventory (GAP). This inventory has been used by
social psychologists at major universities like Princeton and Yale and strongly
predicts life outcomes across many dimensions. We are specifically examining
the probability that people’s lives will be secure, organized, and predictable,
compared to the lives of others. Please respond to the specific GAP Inventory
questions included in this study as honestly and accurately as possible.
Because the results of this inventory may be useful in life planning, the
university has required us to share your results with you. These results are based
on a series of complicated algorithms and condense a large amount of information
about you into interpretable indices. After you complete the GAP inventory, you
will receive your results generated by the GAP algorithms in the three dimensions
of security, organization and predictability described above. Please pay careful
attention to your results, as we will be asking you about what kind of life you
intend to lead based on these results later. After you view your results you will be
given the opportunity to choose one of two short training modules about life
planning that you will complete after the study.
When you are ready to complete the GAP Inventory, please click the
forward arrow at the bottom of the screen.
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Transcendence Threat Prompt
The current study assesses personality traits that have been shown to relate
to the type of life a person will have, and how these traits relate to social behavior.
What follows is a commonly used psychological inventory called the Goal
Achievement Probability Inventory (GAP). This inventory has been used by
social psychologists at major universities like Princeton and Yale and strongly
predicts life outcomes across many dimensions. We are specifically examining
the probability that people’s lives will be fulfilling, purposeful, and engaging,
compared to the lives of others. Please respond to the specific GAP Inventory
questions included in this study as honestly and accurately as possible.
Because the results of this inventory may be useful in life planning, the
university has required us to share your results with you. These results are based
on a series of complicated algorithms and condense a large amount of information
about you into interpretable indices. After you complete the GAP inventory, you
will receive the results generated by the GAP algorithms in the three dimensions
of fulfillment, purpose, and engagement. Please pay careful attention to your
results, as we will be asking you about what kind of life you intend to lead based
on these results later. After you view your results you will be given the
opportunity to choose one of two short training modules about life planning that
you will complete after the study.
When you are ready to complete the GAP Inventory, please click the
forward arrow at the bottom of the screen.
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Appendix L
Threat Feedback From GAP

Coherence Threat Feedback

Goal Achievement Probability (GAP) Results
The results of your GAP inventory are displayed below in the form of a bar chart.
There are two different colored bars in the chart. The black bars represent the
probability that you will live a life characterized by each of the three traits listed
on the left side of the screen that were measured in your GAP inventory. The grey
bars represent the probability that a person selected randomly from the general
population has of living a life characterized by these same three traits. All
probabilities are out of 100%, and can be assessed by comparing the location of
the bars with the percent scale below the chart. For example, if you or someone in
the general population had a rating of 75 for organization, it would mean that you
have a 75% chance of living an organized life. A key is also included above the
chart to remind you of which bars represent yourself and which bars represent the
general population.

You

General Population

Security
Organization
Predictability
0

25

50

75

100

Your Projected Life Outcomes (In Percentages)
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Transcendence Threat Feedback

Goal Achievement Probability (GAP) Results
The results of your GAP inventory are displayed below in the form of a bar chart.
There are two different colored bars in the chart. The black bars represents the
probability that you will live a life characterized by each of the three traits listed
on the left side of the screen that were measured in your GAP inventory. The grey
bars represents the probability that a person selected randomly from the general
population has of living a life characterized by these same three traits. All
probabilities are out of 100%, and can be assessed by comparing the location of
the bars with the percent scale below the chart. For example, if you or someone in
the general population had a rating of 75 for purpose, it would mean that you have
a 75% chance of living an organized life. A key is also included above the chart to
remind you of which bars represent yourself and which bars represent the general
population.

You

General Population

Engagement
Purpose
Fufillment
0

25

50

75

100

Your Projected Life Outcomes (In Percentages)
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Neutral Coherence Feedback

Goal Achievement Probability (GAP) Results
The results of your GAP inventory are displayed below in the form of a bar chart.
There are two different colored bars in the chart. The black bars represents the
probability that you will live a life characterized by each of the three traits listed
on the left side of the screen that were measured in your GAP inventory. The grey
bars represents the probability that a person selected randomly from the general
population has of living a life characterized by these same three traits. All
probabilities are out of 100%, and can be assessed by comparing the location of
the bars with the percent scale below the chart. For example, if you or someone in
the general population had a rating of 75 for organization, it would mean that you
have a 75% chance of living an organized life. A key is also included above the
chart to remind you of which bars represent yourself and which bars represent the
general population.

You

General Population

Security
Organization
Predictability
0

25

50

75

100

Your Projected Life Outcomes (In Percentages)
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Neutral Transcendence Feedback

Goal Achievement Probability (GAP) Results
The results of your GAP inventory are displayed below in the form of a bar chart.
There are two different colored bars in the chart. The black bars represents the
probability that you will live a life characterized by each of the three traits listed
on the left side of the screen that were measured in your GAP inventory. The grey
bars represents the probability that a person selected randomly from the general
population has of living a life characterized by these same three traits. All
probabilities are out of 100%, and can be assessed by comparing the location of
the bars with the percent scale below the chart. For example, if you or someone in
the general population had a rating of 75 for purpose, it would mean that you have
a 75% chance of living an organized life. A key is also included above the chart to
remind you of which bars represent yourself and which bars represent the general
population.
You

General Population

Engagement
Purpose
Fufillment
0

25

50

75

100

Your Projected Life Outcomes (In Percentages)
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Appendix M
Study 3 Manipulation Check

Coherence Threat Condition
We would not like to see how well you understood your GAP scores. Please
indicate, to the best of your memory, your GAP scores on the sliding scales below.
The sliding scales represent your likelihood of having a life characterized by
security, organization, and predictability compared to the population average.
Please move the slider on each line to match your results on the GAP as closely as
possible.
Security

---------------------------------------------------------------------------0
25
50
75
100

Was this score below average, about average or above average compared to the
general population?
Below Average
Above Average
Organization

Average

---------------------------------------------------------------------------0
25
50
75
100

Was this score below average, about average or above average compared to the
general population?
Below Average
Above Average

Average

Predictability---------------------------------------------------------------------------0
25
50
75
100
Was this score below average, about average or above average compared to the
general population?
Below Average
Above Average
1
2
3
4
not at all
To what extent do you feel safe in your
day-to-day life?
How predictable is your day-to-day life?
How organized is your life right now?
How engaging is your life right now?

Average
5

6

1

2

3

4

1
1
1

2
2
2

3
3
3

4
4
4

7
to a great extent
5
6
7
5
5
5

6
6
6

7
7
7

	
  
How purposeful do you feel in your
day-to-day life?
How fulfilled do you feel in your life
right now?
How safe do you think you will be in
your life overall?
How predictable do you think your life
will be overall?
How organized do you think your life
will be overall?
How engaging do you think your life
will be overall?
How purposeful do you think your life
will be overall?
On a day-to-day basis, how happy are
you?
On a day-to day basis, how sad are you?
On a day-to-day basis, how excited are
you?
On a day-to day basis, how anxious are
you?
How happy do you think you will be
about your life overall?
How sad do you think you will be in
your life overall?
How exciting do you think your life will
be overall?
How anxious do you think you will be
in your life overall?
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1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1
1

2
2

3
3

4
4

5
5

6
6

7
7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Transcendence Threat Condition
Below are three sliding scales representing your likelihood of having a secure,
organized, and predictable life. The sliding scales represent your likelihood of
having a life characterized by security, organization, and predictability compared
to the population average. Please move the slider on each line to match your
results on the GAP as closely as possible.
Engagement ---------------------------------------------------------------------------0
25
50
75
100
Was this score below average, about average or above average compared to the
general population?

	
  
Below Average
Above Average

146	
  	
  
Average

Purpose ---------------------------------------------------------------------------0
25
50
75

100

Was this score below average, about average or above average compared to the
general population?
Below Average
Above Average

Average

Fufillment---------------------------------------------------------------------------0
25
50
75
100
Was this score below average, about average or above average compared to the
general population?
Below Average
Above Average

1
2
3
4
not at all
To what extent do you feel safe in your
day-to-day life?
How predictable is your day-to-day life?
How organized is your life right now?
How engaging is your life right now?
How purposeful do you feel in your
day-to-day life?
How fulfilled do you feel in your life
right now?
How safe do you think you will be in
your life overall?
How predictable do you think your life
will be overall?
How organized do you think your life
will be overall?
How engaging do you think your life
will be overall?
How purposeful do you think your life
will be overall?

Average

5

6

7
to a great extent
5
6
7

1

2

3

4

1
1
1
1

2
2
2
2

3
3
3
3

4
4
4
4

5
5
5
5

6
6
6
6

7
7
7
7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

	
  
On a day-to-day basis, how happy are
you?
On a day-to day basis, how sad are you?
On a day-to-day basis, how excited are
you?
On a day-to day basis, how anxious are
you?
How happy do you think you will be
about your life overall?
How sad do you think you will be in
your life overall?
How exciting do you think your life will
be overall?
How anxious do you think you will be
in your life overall?
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1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1
1

2
2

3
3

4
4

5
5

6
6

7
7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7
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Appendix N
Moral and Conventional Importance Measure for Study 3
What follows is a series of statements about what is important to you in life.
Using the scales provided below, please rate the extent to which the behaviors
described in each statement are important to you.
1
2
3
strongly disagree
C1: It is important to me to follow the
conventions of society.
M1: It is more important to me do what I
feel is right than to be do what society
expects of me.
C2: I think I should follow family tradition
when making life decisions.
M2: My moral beliefs should play a large
role in guiding my life choices.
M3: Being trustworthy is a high priority for
me.
C3: Regardless of what I think is right, I
feel I should try to do what is socially
expected of me.
M4: It is important to spend a lot of time
trying hard not to harm others.
C4: Fitting in with social norms, like
wearing acceptable clothing to social
events, is important to me
M5: If I think something goes against my
moral beliefs, I would not do it, even if it
breaks the rules.
C5(R): My family’s customs are not very
important to me.
C6: It is important that people behave based
on common behavioral guidelines, like
putting a napkin in one’s lap, or not talking
on a cell phone on public transit.
M6: Doing what I feel is right is more
important to me than doing what society
considers normal.
C7: The customs I follow in day-to-day life
give me a strong sense of satisfaction.
C8(R): It is not important to me to do what
is considered normal in most situations.

4

5

6

7
strongly agree

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1
1

2
2

3
3

4
4

5
5

6
6

7
7

1
1

2
2

3
3

4
4

5
5

6
6

7
7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

	
  

M7(R): I am not very concerned about
issues that are related to my sense of right
and wrong.
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1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Note: Items marked with a C represent convention and items marked with an M
represent Morality. Items marked with a (R) were reverse coded.

	
  

150	
  	
  
Appendix O
Search for Meaning

Absolutely
Untrue
1

Mostly
Untrue
2

Somewhat
Can’t Say
Somewhat
Untrue
True or False
True
3
4
5

I am looking for something that makes
my life feel meaningful.
I am always looking to find my life’s
purpose.
I am always searching for something
that makes my life feel significant.
I am seeking a purpose or mission for
my life
I am searching for meaning in my life.

Mostly
True
6

Absolutely
True
7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1
1

2
2

3
3

4
4

5
5

6
6

7
7
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Appendix P
Indirect Measure of Desire for Coherence and Transcendence

Now that you have received your GAP results, please select which of the two
training modules below you would like to complete today after the main part of
the study is finished. Each training module is a short series of exercises that you
will complete after the main portion of the study that teach you how to achieve
the goals of leading an organized and well-planned life, or a life characterized by
purpose and meaning.
Module 1: Organization and Planning
This module teaches organization and life planning skills. The goal of this
training module is to impart you with knowledge that will make your life more
organized and predictable.
Module 2: Purpose and Meaning
This module teaches strategies you can use to feel more meaningful in life. The
goal of this training module is to impart you with knowledge you can use to make
your life feel more meaningful and purposeful.

